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Paldor: Lawyers on Auction

LAWYERS ON AUCTION – PROTECTING CLASS MEMEBERS
Ittai Paldor†

INTRODUCTION
When class actions settle, class attorneys often receive hefty fees, while
class members only receive illusory benefits.1 Coupled with the fact that
nearly all class actions settle and that the number of class actions that are
adjudicated is virtually zero,2 this creates a serious problem. The class
action system ends up harming individual class members, who are bound
by the terms of suboptimal settlements. Class actions benefit class
attorneys and defendants at the expense of individual class members—
precisely those individuals that the class action mechanism was put in
place to empower. More than corrective justice for class members is
sacrificed. If class settlements are systematically under-compensatory,
deterrence of wrongdoers is also compromised.
The problem is not surprising. Class members are rationally apathetic,
due to each member’s small individual claim. The same rational apathy
that brings about the need for class actions in the first place renders class
supervision of settlement terms ineffective. 3 As a result, class counsel
may be induced by the defendant to knowingly agree to a deal that is
suboptimal from the class’ perspective in return for increased fees for
counsel. Class counsel may also unintentionally negotiate a deal that is

† Assistant Professor, Hebrew University Faculty of Law (SJD, University of Toronto, Faculty of Law). I
am greatly indebted to Ehud Guttel, Adi Leibovitch, Gideon Prachomovsky and Eyal Zamir, as well as
participants of the Hebrew University Faculty of Law Seminar for helpful discussions, suggestions, and
comments on earlier drafts. The generous financial support by the Israel Science Foundation is also greatly
appreciated. Inbar Assaraf and Tal Mendelson provided invaluable research assistance. All errors remain
my own.
1. U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, U NSTABLE FOUNDATION – OUR BROKEN CLASS
ACTION
SYSTEM
AND
HOW
TO
FIX
IT
4-5
(Oct.
2017),
available
at
http://instituteforlegalreform.org/uploads/sites/1/UnstableFoundation_Web_10242017.pdf ; Howard M.
Erichson, The Problem of Settlement Class Actions, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 951 (2014); CONSUMER
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD–
FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(A) 7(Mar. 2015), available at
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf; EMERY
G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. J UDICIAL CTR., IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT
ON THE FEDERAL C OURTS: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM PHASE T WO'S PRE-CAFA SAMPLE OF
DIVERSITY CLASS ACTIONS (2008); Creative Montessori Learning Ctrs. v. Ashford Gear L.L.C., 662 F.3d
913 (7th. Cir. 2011).
2. Erichson, supra note 1, at 952; CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, supra note 1, at
48-54; LEE & WILLGING, supra note 1, at 11; Creative Montessori Learning, 662 F.3d at 915.
3. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and
Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 883-89 (1987) (identifying additional issues
that exacerbate the problem).
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suboptimal from the class’s perspective. 4 Both are manifestations of the
same agency problem. Class counsel acts as an agent but is not
accountable to the principals.5
As the basic problem is long-recognized, several mechanisms have
been put in place that are geared toward alleviating it. In lieu of effective
supervision by class members, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure requires court approval for class settlements. Rule 23 stipulates
that a court will approve a settlement only if it is fair, reasonable, and
adequate, after considering whether the class was adequately represented,
the proposal was negotiated at arm’s length, and the relief provided for
the class is adequate.6 The Rule also sets the procedure for such approval.7
However, court supervision is notoriously ineffective when class
actions settle.8 The key reason for this has to do with courts’ institutional
capacity and with the parties’ incentives. When class actions are
adjudicated, the parties before the court are adversaries. Class counsel's
incentives are diametrically opposed to defendant's incentives. Class
counsel wants the court to award the highest possible amount to the class.9
Defendants naturally try to persuade the court to award the lowest
possible amount. By contrast, when class actions settle, both parties
before the court—class counsel and the defendant—seek approval of the
settlement. Consequently, the court finds itself in a peculiar position. It
must act as an adversary to the parties before it and as a fiduciary for

4. Creative Montessori, 662 F.3d at 918; Jay Tidmarsh, Auctioning Class Settlements, 56 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 227, 234 (2014); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action
Settlements: An Empirical Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27, 30 (2004).
5. Brian Wolfman & Alan B. Morrison, Representing the Unrepresented in Class Actions Seeking
Monetary Relief, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 439, 441 (1996) (focusing on class members’ whose interests do not
coincide with those of class representative); Coffee, supra note 3; Paul Harzen Beach, The Parens Patriae
Settlement Auction, 52 GONZ. L. REV. 455, 466-72 (2016)(focusing on the specific context of Parens
Patriae settlements. The analysis is equally applicable to class actions).
6. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2)(a) – (c); Quimby v. United States., 107 Fed. Cl. 126 (Fed. Cl., 2012);
In re Uponor, Inc., F1807 Plumbing Fittings Products Liability Litigation, 716 F.3d 1057 (8th Cir. 2013);
Hefler v. Wells Fargo & Company, No. 16-cv-05479-JST, 2018 WL 6619983 ( N.D. Ca. Dec. 17, 2018).
7. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1), (3), (4), (5).
8. Beach, supra note 5, at 466; Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees and
Expenses in Class Action Settlements: 1993–2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 248 (2010).
9. If only because the class's recovery is a key determinant of class counsel’s fees. Although the
court does not necessarily award class counsel a percentage of the class's recovery. See infra notes 94 –
100 and accompanying text.
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absent class members.10 This is a task courts are ill-equipped to perform.11
Courts in an adversarial system are dependent on parties’ rivalry. The
adversarial system is based on the notion that each of the parties will
collect and present the best evidence and arguments to support its position
in an attempt to further its own interests. The court is then vested with the
task of deciding between what are presumably the best cases for each of
the competing positions.12 When cooperation substitutes rivalry, courts
are at an inherent disadvantage vis-à-vis the settling parties. As Professor
Coffee puts it: “the trial court's approval is a weak reed on which to rely
once the adversaries have linked arms and approached the court in a solid
phalanx seeking its approval."13
In addition to their institutional inadequacy, courts also have little
incentive to challenge settlements. Courts are overloaded with cases.
Settlements resolve cases at a relatively low cost to the judiciary and clear
up the docket quickly, and are therefore greatly favored.14 Challenging a
settlement to which the parties have agreed is, from the court’s
perspective, counterproductive, even if the settlement is socially
suboptimal.15
10. Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 2002); In re GMC Pick-Up Truck
Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 784-85 (3d Cir. 1995); Nancy Morawetz, Bargaining, Class
Representation, and Fairness, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1993); Chris Brummer, Note, Sharpening the Sword:
Class Certification, Appellate Review, and the Role of the Fiduciary Judge in Class Action Lawsuits, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 1042, 1060-62 (2004). For a brief account of the effect of the various fee (and cost)
mechanisms on plaintiffs’ attorneys see also Arthur R. Miller, Keynote Address: The American Class
Action: From Birth to Maturity 15 (Jan. 4 2017); Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 8, at 249.
11. Creative Montessori Learning Ctrs. v. Ashford Gear L.L.C., 662 F.3d 913, 917 (7th. Cir. 2011);
Theodore Eisenberg et al., Attorney’s Fees In Class Actions: 2009 – 2013, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 937(2017).
12. See Luke M. Froeb & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Evidence Production in Adversarial vs.
Inquisitorial Regimes, 70 ECON. LETTERS 267 (2001)); Gregory Firestone & Janet Weinstein, In The Best
Interests of Children – A Proposal to Transform the Adversarial System 42(2) FAM. CT. REV. 203, 203
(2004). For a critique of the distinction (although not of the idea that courts may be dependent on the
parties’ submissions) see Monroe H. Freedman, Professionalism in the American Adversary System,
41 EMORY L.J. 467, 469 (1992). Although the arguments focus on the criminal setting, the observations
with respect to adversarial versus inquisitor systems are equally valid in the civil setting.
13. Creative Montessori, 662 F.3d at 917-18; John C. Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The
Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 26-27 (1985). In re Dry
Max Pampers Litig., 724 F.3d 713, 718 (6th Cir., 2013).
14. See infra notes 86 – 88.
15. In this context, the history of patent litigation is instructive. Much like class settlements,
settlements in patent litigation allow the settling parties to negotiate a mutually beneficial deal at the
general public’s expense. Specifically, a generic pharmaceutical company challenging a weak patent may
agree to drop the challenge, thereby extending the brand company’s monopoly, in return for a share of the
rents accruing to the brand company (on the legal framework that enables such deals in the pharmaceutical
industry see C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug Incentives and the
Hatch-Waxman Act, 77(3) ANTITRUST L.J. 947 (2011)). And indeed, although the potential for abuse has
long been recognized in the context of patent litigation, courts have often sanctioned settlements that
clearly harm the public simply because the parties before the court agreed to the settlement (see FTC v.
Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013)). For an analysis and an overview of court rulings pre- and post- Actavis
see Michael A. Carrier, Three Challenges for Pharmaceutical Antitrust, 59 SANTA CLARA L. R EV. 615

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021

3

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 3

2021]

LAWYERS ON AUCTION

347

As an alternative to a review of the terms of the settlement themselves,
the court may attempt to ensure the adequacy of settlements through class
counsel's fees. Specifically, the court may award class counsel fees that
are a percentage of the class's recovery, thereby incentivizing class
counsel to achieve the best possible outcome for the class. However, the
percentage-of-recovery fee method is also ineffective. Several issues with
the award of a percentage-of-recovery fee are discussed subsequently.16
In the current context, we may focus on the two most important issues.
First, the percentage-of-recovery does not in any way safeguard against
class counsel’s genuine miscalculations. Setting fees as a percentage of
the class’s recovery incentivizes class counsel to do the best job it can.
But it does not correct class counsel’s errors. Second, even under a
percentage-of-recovery fee regime, court discretion is unavoidable. A
fixed, one-size-fits-all percentage is inadequate. The precise percentage
must be calibrated to compensate counsel for case-specific effort, risk,
resources, labor, etc. Otherwise, riskier class actions (from the class’s
perspective), as well as class actions that require more labor than average,
will not be filed. Therefore, some degree of court discretion must be
maintained, which reintroduces the court’s institutional inadequacy (and
disincentive) to act as the parties’ adversary. The parties may present the
case as more complex than it is, argue that an irregular amount of labor
was required, and so on. Finally, as the examples at the beginning of this
Article illustrate, a settlement may seem to award class members a
different amount than it actually does. This Article provides several
additional examples of gross misrepresentations of the class’s recovery.17
In addition to the two court supervision mechanisms—review of the
settlement terms and judicial control of class counsel’s fees—there are
two additional mechanisms that rely on class members and may
theoretically alleviate the agency problem in the context of class
settlements. First, class members may file objections to settlements. 18
Second, class members may opt out of the class if they find the settlement
to be unfair.19 These mechanisms also fail to adequately protect class
members against abuses of class settlements. In a nutshell, both
mechanisms rely on class members taking action. Therefore, they are
subject to the same issue that brings about the settlement-inadequacy
problem in the first place–class members’ rational apathy. They also
suffer from additional shortcomings that this Article surveys at greater

(2020)).
16.
17.
18.
19.

See infra text accompanying notes 92 – 111.
See infra text accompanying notes 25 – 32.
See infra note 112.
See infra note 124.
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length.20
Ultimately, the existing mechanisms fail miserably. It has been argued
that “most class actions lead to no recovery for absent class members, at
all, and those that do quite often provide only minimal benefits”.21 Studies
have found that gains reaped by plaintiffs’ lawyers are grossly
disproportionate to the supposed benefits of attorney-driven class
actions,22 and that “too many cases are settled with illusory benefits to
class members and large fees for lawyers”.23 There is an abundance of
examples where “class members received nearly worthless coupons and
class counsel walked away with large fees”. 24 Some settlements
nominally award class members a large amount, but effectively make
individual compensation not worth the trouble of collecting it. 25 For
example, in a nationwide Sears class action settlement, class members
were compensated in the form of coupons. Plaintiffs’ attorney received
approximately $1 million, while the 1.5 million class members redeemed
a total of $2,402.26 In an alleged price-fixing cartel in the airline industry,
customers received coupons that could be redeemed for future flights. The
coupons were severely restricted, could not be combined with other
20. In fact, they introduce a host of additional complications, such as strategic objections designed
to extract a share of class counsel’s payment. See infra text accompanying notes 118 – 123.
21. Letter from David Hirschmann & Lisa Rickard on behalf of U.S. Chamber of Commerce &
Institute for Legal Reform to Monica Jackson, Office of the Executive Secretary, Consumer Financial
Protection
Bureau
4
(Aug.
22,
2016),
available
at
https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/2016_8_22_Chamber_Arbitration_Comment_L
etter.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Hirschmann and Rickard]; Erichson, supra note 1, at 952; Robert H.
Hayes & William J. Abernathy, Managing Our Way to Economic Decline, 58 HARV. BUS. REV. 67, 70, 77
(2007).
22. Letter from Hirschmann & Rickard, id., at 3. See also, in the specific context of The Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (“PSLRA”), Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform:
Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 533, 534-37 (1997). CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION
BUREAU, supra note 1, at Section 6, 37. > (“CFPB Study”); Do Class Actions Benefit Class Members?
An Empirical Analysis of Class Actions, MAYER BROWN (Dec. 11, 2013), at:
https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/uploads/Documents/PDFs/2013/December/DoClassActionsBenefitC
lassMembers.pdf (“Chamber Study”); Jason Scott Johnston, High Cost, Little Compensation, No Harm
to Deter: New Evidence on Class Actions Under Federal Consumer Protection Statutes, U. VA. L. &
ECON. RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 2016-12 (May 2016), available at http://ssrn.com/ abstract=2777618.
See Andrew Pincus, Assessing ‘The Value of Class Actions,’ LAW360 (Aug. 22, 2017),
https://www.law360.com/foodbeverage/ articles/956215/assessing-the-value-ofclass-actions-.
23. U.S. CHAMBER I NSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, UNSTABLE FOUNDATION, supra note 1, at 2.
24. Tidmarsh, supra note 4, at 236. See also Eversheds Sutherland, LLP, A Study Abroad: Will
Europe Adopt the US Class Action Mechanism?, LEXOLOGY (June 4, 2018),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=7d6ceae7-700a-4984-90ec-4d94ecfd5edd. Deborah L.
Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting the Problem, Recasting the Solution,
54 DUKE L.J. 447, 465 n.136 (2004).
25. Rhode, id., at 465. Steven B. Hantler & Robert E. Norton, Coupon Settlements: The Emperor’s
Clothes Of Class Actions, TRUTH IN A DVERTISING 1 (Oct. 2013), https://www.truthinadvertising.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/Exhibit-C.pdf.
26. Ted Frank, Moody v Sears: Lawyers, $1M. Class, $2,402, OVERLAWYERED (May 5,
2007), http://www.overlawyered.com/2007/05/moody_v_sears_lawyers_1m_class.html.
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discounts, were only good for up to 10% off a flight and were subject to
black-out dates.27 Class attorneys collected more than $50 million in fees,
in what critics argued was in fact “‘a promotional scheme to induce
travelers to fly’ during off-peak travel periods”.28 A class action against
Blockbuster Video settled in a cumbersome coupon arrangement,
according to which clients would have to visit the store at least twice 29 for
the benefit of a $1 discount off a rental. 30 Class attorneys received $9.25
million in fees.31 The problem is omnipresent in cash settlements as
well.32
This Article suggests a simple market-based mechanism that
guarantees the adequacy of class settlements: an ex post auction of
appointment as class counsel. Once a settlement has been reached, the
right to step in as class counsel is auctioned. The minimum bid is the
amount the defendant agreed to pay class counsel in accordance with the
settlement agreement. The highest bidder pays original class counsel the
amount bid and is then appointed as class counsel. Newly-appointed class
counsel may then pursue the case as she deems fit. She may renegotiate a
settlement with the defendant, adjudicate the case, or combine the two by
continuing to litigate the case and settling with the defendant at a later
stage. There is only one limitation on the fees new class counsel may be
paid in any future settlement or ruling: the ratio between class recovery
and class counsel’s fees remains as it was in the original settlement. The
only way for new class counsel to receive more than she paid original
class counsel is to increase class members’ recovery.
The mechanism developed here spontaneously assures the
appropriateness of the settlement. Both instances of a sellout by class
counsel and instances of genuine under-estimation of the value of the
class’s claim will be corrected by the market. This result will be shown in
greater detail in subsequent sections. But a simple numeric example is
27. Hantler & Norton, supra note 25, at 1 – 2.
28. Id. at 2 (citing David Johnson, Settlement of Airline Suit Draws Critics; Coupons May Bring
Carriers More Business, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 2, 1993, at 1 (Business). See also In re GMC Pick-Up Truck
Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 784-85 (3d Cir. 1995).
29. Class members could only collect and file a claim form at a Blockbuster outlet. After the claim
had been processed, the customer was required to visit the store again to rent the video at a discount.
30. Johnson v. Scott, 113 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. App. 2003). Compensation would not, in any case,
exceed $18 per client.
31. Some commentators labeled the Blockbuster settlement ‘Exhibit A’ in the case against class
actions, that had been attacked as “shakedowns that mainly enrich the lawyers who bring them.” See, e.g.,
Dan Ackman, Top Of The News: Bogus Blockbuster Settlement, FORBES (June 6, 2001),
https://www.forbes.com/2001/06/06/0606topblock.html#36aa181bcea6. See also Hantler & Norton,
supra note 25, at 3; Ameet Sachdev, Coupon Awards Reward Whom?, CHI. TRIB . (Feb. 29, 2004),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2004-02-29-0402290522-story.html
(offering
the
Cheerios case as another illustrative example)).
32. See also Robert G. Bone, Walking the Class Action Maze: Toward a More Functional Rule 23,
46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1097, 1110 (2013).
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helpful at this stage. Let us suppose that class counsel and a defendant
reach a settlement whereby class members receive $100, and class
counsel is paid $10 in fees. If the settlement is the best attainable
settlement from the class’s perspective, 33 no one will find it worthwhile
to purchase the right to step in as class counsel. The prospects of
recovering more than $100 for the class are not promising. Consequently,
receiving more than $10 in fees is unlikely. Any attorney who purchased
the right to act as class counsel would be paying original class counsel
$10 to receive an asset (appointment as class counsel) that is worth no
more than $10. However, if the settlement is suboptimal for whatever
reason, acting as class counsel becomes a lucrative investment. Fees are
fixed at 10% of class recovery, and the true value of the class’s claim is
higher than $100. The more gross the inadequacy of the settlement, the
more lucrative it becomes to be appointed as class counsel. If, for
example, the case can be settled for $500, the right to act as class counsel
is worth $50. Whether class counsel mistakenly negotiated a deal it
genuinely thought was beneficial to class members, missed some piece of
important evidence, or knowingly agreed to a bad deal in return for an
increase in fees, acting as class counsel presents a lucrative investment
opportunity for any attorney that identifies this inadequacy.
Importantly, the mechanism obviates the need for court overview of
settlements. The court need not review the adequacy of the settlement, its
reasonableness, or its fairness. The court need not even bother itself with
the appropriateness of class counsel’s fees as agreed within the
framework of the settlement. There is no need for any court involvement
at all, and public expenditure is completely curbed.
The method developed in this Article economizes on public
expenditure and court resources (that are, as explained, ineffective in the
current setting). At the same time, it also guarantees that terms of class
settlements will be closely monitored by a large number of law firms
competing amongst themselves to identify inadequate class settlements.
Because potential class counsel is only required to pay a fraction of the
value of the total payment to the class,34 any law firm capable of handling

33. The best attainable settlement is one in which class members receive the largest possible
amount given the expected value of their claim, taking into account all relevant information, a fair
assessment of the defendant's chances of success, the time it would take to try the case, the defendant’s
sensitivity to the reputational cost of litigation and an adverse ruling, and any other factor.
34. Attorney’s fees are a fraction of the class’s recovery, which implies that there will be a larger
supply of competitors if they are required to pay attorney’s fees rather than the full amount of the class’s
recovery. The ratio of attorney’s fees to total recovery is, of course, important. This point is elaborated on
subsequently, largely following Eisenberg et al., supra note 11. Generally, attorney’s fees are
approximately 25% of the class’s recovery. But there is also a scaling effect. The larger the case, the
smaller the percentage of attorney’s fees. For current purposes, the general point is important – attorney’s
fees are smaller than the class’s recovery by orders of magnitude.
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the case on behalf of the class can participate in the auction. The number
of economic agents reviewing the adequacy of settlements is thus
multiplied by thousands. Rather than ineffective supervision by the court,
a single disincentivized agent, at the public’s expense, numerous law
firms of the plaintiffs’ bar can be expected to closely follow the terms of
class settlements.
If a second settlement is reached by new class counsel, the process is
repeated. The process repeats until a settlement is reached after which no
one is willing to bid for appointment as class counsel. This provides
comfort that the final settlement will be the best attainable one. Given that
law firms of the plaintiffs’ bar compete between them in the first auction,
one can expect there to typically be only one round of bidding. The price
paid for appointment as class counsel in the first round should reflect the
best attainable settlement. In the numeric example presented above, in
which the value of the class’s claim is $500, the price paid for
appointment as class counsel in the first auction should be $50 (or
marginally less). Second class counsel can then be expected to negotiate
a $500 settlement (otherwise she will not have profited at all), and no one
should be willing to bid in the second auction. But if, for whatever reason,
neither first class counsel nor second class counsel have negotiated the
best attainable settlement for the class, subsequent auctions should rectify
this. Regardless of how many settlements have been negotiated, if
additional sums can be extracted from the defendant, someone should be
willing to bid for appointment as class counsel. Once again, the court
never needs to review the terms of any of the settlements. It simply
auctions appointment as class counsel until there are no bids, and
rubberstamps the last settlement reached.
By solving the problem of inappropriate settlements, the mechanism
developed in this Article also indirectly solves another extremely
perplexing problem of class actions–the so called ‘reverse auction’ that
plagues the initial appointment of class counsel. Often enough,
specifically when a class action is filed in the wake of a scandal that has
received significant media coverage, various firms of the plaintiffs’ bar
compete amongst themselves for appointment as class counsel. One way
in which a law firm may secure such appointment is by reaching a
settlement with the defendant. Once such a settlement is reached and
sanctioned by the court, all other law firms are preempted from
adjudicating the case. This competition amongst law firms of the
plaintiffs’ bar allows the defendant to negotiate a settlement with those
class attorneys that are willing to settle for the smallest amount, thereby
precluding all other claims.35 A race to the bottom ensues. The different
35. Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 282 (7th Cir. 2002).
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firms seeking appointment as class counsel, each afraid to be underbid by
others and receive nothing for their efforts, compete by offering the
defendant a low-ball settlement. Courts are forced to devote significant
resources to address this concern. 36 This problem too is solved through
the use of the method developed in this Article. The terms of the first
settlement and the initial race to the bottom become moot.
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows: Part I elaborates
on class action settlements and on the inadequacy of existing monitoring
mechanisms. Part II elaborates on the mechanism developed in this
Article and explains how it overcomes the problems associated with
monitoring class action settlements. Part III discusses a theoretical
alternative to the mechanism proposed in this Article and explains why
the method proposed in this Article is superior to the alternative. Part IV
concludes.
I. MONITORING CLASS SETTLEMENTS: THE INADEQUACY OF EXISTING
MECHANISMS
Class actions provide a legal tool for redressing small-individual, but
large-overall harm.37 In such settings, each class member’s expected
private recovery is typically far less than the expected costs of litigation.38
Therefore, no individual class member will find it worthwhile to incur the
expenses of litigation.39 It is also impractical for class members to actively
join forces with each other so that the costs of litigation may be shared.
Coordination among an extremely large and regularly dispersed group of
individuals is difficult and costly, and very often impossible. 40 The
transaction costs of such coordination and the possibility of (rational)
strategic free riding on the part of some class members leave little hope
of joint action being taken.41 Consequently, wrongdoers who inflict harm
on a dispersed group might go undeterred, and class members might go
uncompensated. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing class
36. For a survey of this issue (and a suggested solution to the problem of initial appointment of
class counsel) see Alon Klement & Moran Ofir, Auctioning Class Action Representation (Apr. 15, 2019),
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3329380.
37. James N. Phillips, Class Actions, 3 J. CORP. L. 649 (1978).
38. James E. Lyons, Class Actions, 1974 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 349 (1975); Tom Ford, Rule 23: A
Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. I ND. & COM. L. REV. 501 (1969).
39. Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems and Class
Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 76-77 (2007).
40. David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases,
115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 848 (2002); Tidmarsh, supra note 4, at 230-31; Bone, supra note 32, at 1103.
41. For an analysis of the transaction costs of taking joint action (for example by retaining a single
firm) and the resulting under deterrence problem see Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart" and
"Blackmail" Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1387-88
(2000).
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actions are designed to address these issues. They lay the legal foundation
for representation of the class by attorneys who have not been appointed
by class members.42 They also incentivize these attorneys to act on behalf
of the class by allowing them to collect fees without negotiating these fees
with their “clients”—class members.43
A. The Basic Problem
The rational apathy of class members and the formidable transaction
costs of taking joint action, which bring about the need for this mechanism
in the first place, plague the relationship between class members and class
counsel as well.44 Class counsel’s identity, fees, and performance are of
very little importance to individual class members. Class members’
incentives to get involved in any of these is even smaller than their interest
in the action itself.45 Consequently, there is a real risk that attorneys may
seek to be appointed as class counsel even though they are unfit to serve
as class counsel, whether due to incompetence, lack of resources to
litigate a complicated case, or any other reason.46 Once class counsel has
been appointed, she has both the incentive and ample opportunity to act

42. Formally, two economic agents, neither of whom has been appointed by class members, act on
behalf of the class – class counsel and class plaintiff (or ‘named plaintiff’). The latter is a class member
who also acts on behalf of the class. However, class plaintiffs may be disregarded for current purposes.
To begin with, class actions are normally driven by attorneys, with class plaintiffs as mere eponyms,
whose name only “graces the marquee.” Geoffrey P. Miller, Competing Bids in Class Actions, 31 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 633, 634 (2003); see also Noel Hensley, Notes: Law Partner of Class Plaintiff Barred from
Serving as Class Counsel: Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 31 SMU L. REV. 601 (1977); Leslie, supra
note 39, at 81; Klement & Ofir, supra note 36, at 2 (“For over fifty years, class actions in the US have
been initiated and litigated by self-driven entrepreneurial lawyers.”). Closely related, class plaintiffs’
service awards are normally insignificant amounts, in the tune of several thousands of dollars. Finally,
and most importantly, even if class plaintiffs are actively involved and control the class action in any
meaningful way, the analysis of class counsels’ incentives is equally applicable to class representatives’
service awards. On the possible convergence of the two see Neil L. Rock, Note, Class Action Counsel as
Named Plaintiff: Double Trouble, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 111 (1987). See also Bone, supra note 32, at
1103.
43. Leslie, supra note 39, at 76 (citing Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942,
952 (E.D. Tex. 2000)). See also Tidmarsh, supra note 4, at 234.
44. Leslie, supra note 39, at 76 – 77; Klement & Ofir, supra note 36, at 2.
45. Theoretically, each of these factors—the identity of class counsel, class counsel’s fees, and
class counsel’s performance—may be determinative of the full amount of recovery, making class
members’ interest in the relevant factor equal to their interest in the class action itself. For example, if
class counsel is entirely incompetent or sets her fees at 100% of recovery, this impacts the full amount of
the recovery. But this will be the extreme case. In all other cases, each of these factors only affects a
portion of the recovery – the portion lost because of counsel’s inability relative to alternative counsel, or
the excessive share of the defendant’s payment charged by counsel as fees. Therefore, class members’
interest in each of these factors is no greater than their interest in the action itself, and in most cases will
be much smaller.
46. Alon Harel & Alex Stein, Auctioning for Loyalty: Selection and Monitoring of Class Counsel,
22 YALE L. & POL'Y R EV. 69, 71 (2004).
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in her own self-interest. The principles, class members, are unlikely to
effectively monitor the agent’s performance. 47
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure attempt to address these
problems with a host of mechanisms for the appointment of class counsel,
for monitoring class counsel’s performance, and for awarding class
counsel fees.48 Common to these rules is the substitution of the court’s
discretion for the contractual relationship that would be expected had
class members been regular clients. Rather than contracting with class
members, class counsel seeks court approval on a variety of issues.
Class settlements present a unique setting in which class members’
absence is most problematic. 49 Class settlements are unique, because class
counsel and the defendant have a joint interest that is directly opposed to
that of class members. This is true specifically with respect to two
elements of the settlement: class members’ compensation, and class
definition. With respect to the settlement amount, both settling parties
have a joint incentive to increase class counsel’s fees at the expense of
class members’ compensation. With respect to class definition—deciding
on whom the settlement will be binding—both parties have an incentive
to define the class broadly. To explain this, it is helpful to first briefly
review the concept of class certification.
Class certification is the process of allowing class counsel to act on
behalf of class members and defining the class on behalf of which the case
will be handled. In class settlements, the defendants pay class members
in return for a release.50 Naturally, defendants seek release from all class
47. In some circumstances, most importantly in securities cases, there may be an individual class
member whose stake in the case is large enough to justify involvement in the case. For example, the class
member who owned or purchased the largest number of shares in a public offering. Such a class member
may engage with counsel. The PSLRA, supra note 22, establishes a refutable presumption according to
which the person or persons with the largest financial interest in the case is the most adequate lead plaintiff.
See also Fisch, supra note 22.
48. For example, courts appoint class counsel, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g), and courts may demand a
litigation plan as well as any other pertinent information, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(c). See Parkinson v.
Hyundai Motor America, Nos. CV06-345AHS (MLGX), CV06-3161AHS(MLGX, 2006 WL 2289801, at
*2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2006); Hill v. The Tribune Co., Nos. 05 C 2602, 05 C 2640, 05 C 2684, O5 C 2927,
05 C 3374, 05 C 3377, 05 C 3390, 05 C 3928, 2005 WL 3299144, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2005). In re
Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., 240 F.R.D. 56, 57 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Durso v. Samsung Elecs.
Am., Inc., Nos. 2:12-cv-5352 (DMC)(JAD), 2:12-cv-5412 (DMC)(JAD), 2:12-cv-5440 (DMC)(JAD),
2013 WL 4084640 (Aug. 7, 2013). Courts may issue appropriate orders as the case is adjudicated. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d). In re School Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1992); Oppenheimer Fund, Inc.
v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978); Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100 (1981); Reid v. Unilever U.S.,
Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 893, 925 (N.D. Ill. 2013). Naturally, the litigation plan courts may demand when
appointing class counsel also allows them to monitor performance in the course of adjudication.
49. Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 834 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1987).
50. The legal tool for precluding a plaintiff from relitigating a case is res judicata. An adjudicated
case is said to create res judicata between the parties to the proceeding, preventing a future court from
rehearing the case. See generally Robert Von Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 Yale L.J. 299, 334 (1929).
For an elaborate account of res judicata in mass litigation (although in the context of parens patria
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members, or at least from as many class members as possible.51 Class
members on whom the settlement is not binding may subsequently file
lawsuits against the settling defendant. In order to sell the release on
behalf of class members, the class must be certified. That is, class counsel
must be appointed as the attorney for class members and be allowed to
act on their behalf.52 Most certified class actions are certified for the
purpose of settlement.53 A recent survey encompassing 562 class action
cases found that none of the class actions surveyed ultimately went to
trial. Certification independent of settlement was found in less than two
percent of the cases. “Where class certification occurs, it is typically in
conjunction with class settlement”.54 A similar survey for an earlier period
reports similar results.55 In practice, therefore, class certification is
seldom sought as a means of allowing a lawsuit to be filed and adjudicated
on the class’s behalf. It is obtained almost exclusively as a means of
sanctioning a settlement negotiated between class counsel and the
defendant.
Outside the context of settlements, class counsel and the defendant
have diametrically opposed interests both with respect to class definition
and with respect to the amount paid out to each class member. Class
counsel prefers the largest award to the class, if only because this impacts
her fees.56 Defendants naturally prefer the lowest possible award.
Similarly, class counsel benefits from the broadest class definition
because the larger the class, the greater the overall payout. For the same
reason, defendants prefer a narrow class definition. But when class
actions settle, the incentives are reversed. A class settlement naturally

lawsuits) see Gabrielle J. Hanna, The Helicopter State: Misuse Of Parens Patriae Unconstitutionally
Precludes Individual And Class Claims, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1955, 1957-58 (2017).
51. U.S. CHAMBER I NSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, UNSTABLE FOUNDATION, supra note 11, at 3.
Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, class members are generally afforded an opportunity to opt out of the
class before approval of a settlement, even if they have already been afforded the opportunity at the
certification stage (subject to the court’s discretion – see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(4)). Class settlements
typically contain a provision addressing the possibility that some class members will opt out of the class.
Normally, if an agreed percentage of class members opts out of the class, the settlement is altered or
nullified. See Plaintiff Joy L. Bowens’ Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, Award of
Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, and Approval of Class Representative Service Award and Suggestions in
Support Thereof, Joy L. Bowens v. Mazuma Credit Union, No. 4:15-cv-00758-DW, 2018 WL 8756245
(W.D. Mo. July 16, 2018); Castillo v. ADT, LLC, Civ. No. 2:15-383 WBS DB, 2017 WL 363109 (E.D.
Cal. Jan. 24, 2017).
52. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
53. Erichson, supra note 2, at 952.
54. U.S. CHAMBER I NSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, U NSTABLE FOUNDATION, supra note 1, at
6.2.2.
55. MAYER BROWN, supra note 23, at 1. (“In our entire data set, not one of the class actions ended
in a final judgment on the merits for the plaintiffs. And none of the class actions went to trial, either before
a judge or a jury”).
56. See supra note 9.
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contains two elements that are negotiated in conjunction: compensation
for the class and class counsel’s fees. Class counsel’s fees normally
constitute a fraction of the overall payment. 57 But, naturally, this is the
element of the settlement that class counsel is most sensitive to. This is
what creates the foundation for a sellout deal, where class counsel
receives an increased payment in return for agreeing to a reduced payment
to class members or a subset of class members, or for a broader definition
of the class.
First, and most intuitively, all class members’ individual compensation
may be reduced by an amount that is unlikely to be contested and may not
even be observed. A “discount” of one dollar in the amount payable to
each class member is likely to go unnoticed, or at least unchallenged. But
if the class is comprised of a million individuals, this will decrease
defendant’s total payment by $1 million. The defendant should be willing
to increase class counsel’s fees by up to that amount. Whether fees are
collected directly from the defendant under a fee-shifting statute,58 or
nominally collected from the class’s recovery (which the defendant pays),
the outcome is no different. The total amount accruing to the class may
be reduced in return for an increase in class counsel’s fees.59
A second form of sellout is the sellout of specific subclasses, or an
overly broad definition of the class.60 For example, in the famous Amchem
Products, Inc. v. Windsor case,61 a class action against asbestos
manufacturers, the purported settling class included all employees who
had been exposed to asbestos as well as certain family members of those
employees.62 Importantly, the class included all employees (and family
members) who had been exposed to asbestos prior to the date of the
settlement, whether or not they had already sustained injury or presented
relevant symptoms (the so-called “exposure-only plaintiffs”). The
settlement may have been fair to those class members who had already
exhibited symptoms of one of the relevant diseases. But it aimed to create
res judicata against those class members who had not yet exhibited
57. Erichson, supra note 2; Eisenberg et al., supra note 11.
58. Note, State Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes: Are We Quietly Repealing the American Rule?, 47
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 321, 322-23 (1984); Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 965 (9th Cir. 2003);
See also Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 4, at 30.
59. When the defendant does not directly pay class counsel’s fee, the sellout cannot take the form
of a side payment, as such side payments must be disclosed (see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(3)). The deal will
thus take the form of not contesting a specific fee request, or not challenging certain arguments with
respect to time invested, tasks undertaken, and the like. See infra text accompanying notes 89 – 102.
60. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5).
61. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
62. The class included people who had been exposed “..either occupationally or through the
occupational exposure of a spouse or household member, to asbestos or to asbestos-containing products
for which one or more of the Defendants may bear legal liability..”, as well as "[a]ll spouses, parents,
children, and other relatives… of [those class members]…” Id. at 603 n.5.
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symptoms and prevented them from filing a future lawsuit, if and when
they experienced bodily injury or other harm. The exposure-only subclass
was not properly compensated for this waiver. Similarly, in a securities
class action against Verifone Holdings, 63 a public company listed both in
the U.S. and abroad, the settling class included both investors in the U.S.
and in foreign countries.64 The proposed notice of the settlement would
have been sufficient for U.S. investors. But it would have likely resulted
in very few foreign investors realizing that they were entitled to
compensation, although they were to be bound by the settlement
agreement.65
Class counsel and defendants can be expected to choose between
mistreating the entire class and mistreating a specific subclass or
subclasses, based on the relative sensitivity of each of the subclasses. If
there is a specific subclass that is least sensitive to the settlement, that
subclass will be targeted. If not, all class members’ compensation can be
reduced by an amount that the parties believe will survive court scrutiny.
The upshot of this observation is that when a class settlement is
presented, both the settlement terms themselves and class definition raise
concern.66
B. Existing Mechanisms
Of the various mechanisms that are currently in place for supervising
class counsel, four may seemingly be harnessed to overcome the agency
problem in the specific context of class settlements. First, and most
directly, settlements require court approval. Courts will only approve a
settlement if it is fair, reasonable, and adequate. 67 Second, courts decide
on class counsel’s fees.68 Structuring fees as a percentage of the class’s
63. Stipulation of Settlement, In re Verifone Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 3:07-cv-06140-EMC
(N.D.
Ca.
Aug.
9,
2013),
available
at
http://securities.stanford.edu/filingsdocuments/1038/PAY_01/201389_r01s_07CV06140.pdf.
64. Id. at 6.
65. See CA 22300-05-15 (Central District Court) Moshe Hayit v. Verifone Systems Inc. [published
on Nevo, May 14th, 2018; in Hebrew).
66. While the two issues are intertwined in the context of settlements, they are analytically distinct.
The two issues have now been clearly severed by the amended Civil Procedure Rules that came into force
in December 2018. These require the court to consider whether it is likely to both approve the proposal
and certify the class before notice of the proposed settlement is sent to class members – see FED. R. CIV.
P. 23(e)(1)(b)(i)-(b)(ii). See also BOLCH J UD. INST., DUKE LAW SCHOOL, GUIDELINES AND BEST
PRACTICES IMPLEMENTING 2018 AMENDMENTS TO RULE 23 CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS 2
– 3 (Aug. 2018), available at https://judicialstudies.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Class-ActionsBest-Practices-Final-Version.pdf (“Guidelines and Best Practices”).
67. See supra note 6.
68. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h). In re Mercury Interactive Corp. Sec. Litig., 618 F.3d 988, 993 (9th Cir.
2010); Keil v. Lopez, 862 F.3d 685 (8th Cir. 2017); Geneva Rock Prods., Inc. v. United States, 119 Fed.
Cl. 581 (Fed. Cl.2015); Saccoccio v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 297 F.R.D. 683 (S.D. Fla. 2014).
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recovery ostensibly overcomes the agency problem. Third, class members
may voice objections to settlements.69 Finally, class members may opt out
of such settlements.70 This Section reviews these mechanisms and their
inadequacies.
1. Court Supervision
The first existing mechanism designed to secure the adequacy of class
settlements is the court's review of the terms of the settlement. Rule
23(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure stipulates that:
The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class—or a class proposed
to be certified for purposes of settlement—may be settled, voluntarily
dismissed, or compromised only with the court's approval.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2) orders the court to approve a settlement that
would bind class members only after finding that it is fair, reasonable, and
adequate. In deciding whether the settlement is fair, reasonable, and
adequate, the court must consider, among other factors, whether the class
was adequately represented by class representatives and class counsel, 71
whether the proposal was negotiated at arm's length,72 and whether the
relief to the class is adequate, taking into account the costs, risks, and
delay of trial and appeal.73 In order to safeguard against side agreements,74
the parties seeking approval must file statements identifying any
agreement made in connection with the proposal.75 Any such agreement
is also to be considered by the court when evaluating the settlement. 76
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also address the appropriateness
of certification and class definition. They allow the court to divide the
class into subclasses, each of which may then be treated as a class. 77
Despite these formal requirements, court supervision is an ineffective
measure for securing the adequacy of settlements. The reason, as briefly
outlined above, is that the only parties before the court—class counsel and
the defendant—have a joint interest in the approval of the settlement. The
deal may or may not be fair, reasonable, and adequate. But once class
69. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2); (e)(5).
70. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(b), (e)(4).
71. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2)(A).
72. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2)(B)
73. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(C)(i).
74. BOLCH JUD. INST., supra note 66, at 16; Gary E. Mason & Jennifer S. Goldstein, Unveiling
The New Class Action Rules, AM. ASS’N FOR JUST. (Nov. 2018), available at
https://archive.justice.org/what-we-do/enhance-practice-law/publications/trial-magazine/unveiling-newclass-action-rules.
75. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3).
76. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2)(C)(iv).
77. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5).
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counsel and the defendant have reached an agreement, they both want it
to be sanctioned. The hallmark of litigation is "a clash between
proponents of conflicting views,"78 and the court is deprived of the
benefits of this clash when a settlement has been reached.
The most immediate problem arises in assessing the fairness,
reasonableness, and adequacy of the settlement terms themselves. Courts
build on the adversarial relationship between parties. 79 Litigation is
normally a zero-sum game, in which any dollar paid to plaintiff comes
out of defendant’s pockets, and any dollar saved by defendant comes at
plaintiff’s expense. Each party can, therefore, be expected to do its best
to improve its position vis-à-vis that of the opposing party. But litigation
loses this feature if class counsel’s fees can be increased in return for a
reduction in the total amount paid to the class. The litigation process in
this setting is, essentially, an ex parte process80 with the illusion of an
adversarial one. The parties before the court attempt to persuade it that a
settlement is adequate. Whether or not this is the case, neither party can
be expected to unearth evidence or conduct in-depth legal research in an
attempt to challenge its opponent’s contentions. A court cannot be
expected to effectively supervise the adequacy of a specific outcome if
neither party before it submits evidence, brings forward witnesses, or
contests the adequacy of the settlement.
Court supervision is generally ineffective regardless of class counsel’s
motives for agreeing to an inappropriate settlement. Let us assume that
class counsel genuinely believes that a settlement is optimal from the
class’s perspective (after factoring all relevant factors, i.e. the risks of
litigation, costs, expected length of litigation, etc.). Let us further assume
that class counsel is mistaken. Class counsel may have missed a “smoking
gun”, may have conducted insufficient legal research, may have
underestimated how sensitive the defendant is to press coverage
associated with litigation, or otherwise under-evaluated the full amount
that can be extracted from the defendant. Regardless of the reason,
defendant will naturally see little reason to point to class counsel’s error,
and the court will consequently be unlikely to realize that the settlement

78. Monroe Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three
Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1470 (1966). See also Burmah Oil Co. v. Bank of England, 1
WLR 473, 484 (1979) (H.L.) (Eng.); "Truth is best discovered by powerful statements on both sides of
the question" Lord Eldon, Ex parte Lloyd, 70, 72 (1822).
79. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, I NTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 282 (2nd ed., 1887)
Zweigert, K. & Ktz, H., A N INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW Tr. T. Weir (T. Weir trans., 2d ed.
1987).
80. Parties are notified of the hearing and may participate in it. Formally, the hearing is not an ex
parte hearing. But the notice is generally ineffective, with the general exception of ‘professional
objectors’, that do not serve absent class members. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(B); see also infra notes
118 – 123.
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is suboptimal.
Court supervision is also ineffective in monitoring class definition, the
appropriate division into subclasses, and the inclusion of certain
subclasses in the class.81 As with the terms of the settlement, the court is
ineffective regardless of class counsel’s motives for (inappropriately)
including a subclass in the general class. Class counsel may intentionally
sell out a specific subclass because that subclass is less sensitive to the
settlement terms, or because including the specific subclass makes the
sellout easier to conceal. Class counsel may also unintentionally include
a subclass in the general class without realizing that the subclass has
divergent interests. Once again, the defendant has little reason to flag this.
In general, regarding the effect certification has on the defendant, class
certification within the framework of settlements is the exact opposite of
certification for adjudication. When class actions are certified for
litigation, certification is damaging to defendant’s interests. 82 A large
number of individual lawsuits, which would otherwise never have been
filed83 (or would have been filed “only [by] a lunatic or fanatic”) 84 are
allowed to be jointly adjudicated by class counsel. And the larger the
class, the larger the expected payment. By contrast, when a class action is
settled, certification works to the benefit of the defendant. The larger the
class, the more potential lawsuits are barred by res judicata and the larger
the benefits of the settlement.85
Thus, even if neither class counsel nor the defendant have intentionally
targeted a specific subclass, the defendant cannot be expected to contest
a definition of the class that is too broad. Absent any challenge from the
defendant, the court is deprived of its main source of objections to class
counsel’s contentions.
To add to the court’s incapability of reviewing the various elements of
a settlement, the court also has little incentive to challenge a settlement.
Courts are overloaded with cases, 86 and settlements are the easiest way to

81. Although it is nominally vested with this responsibility – FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5).
82. In re GMC Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 785 (3d Cir. 1995). In
fact, as the court notes, the very threat of class certification may be abused to “create the opportunity for
a kind of legalized blackmail.” Id. at 784.
83. Hantler & Norton, supra note 25, at 2.
84. Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004).
85. Wolfman & Morrison, supra note 5, at 444; Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141, 154 – 55
(S.D. Ohio 1992).
86. Alessandro Martinuzzi, Taking Justice Seriously: The Problem of Courts Overload and the
New Model of Judicial Process, 8 CIV. PROC. REV. 1, 65-106 (Jan.-Apr. 2017), available at
www.civilprocedurereview.com. On the overload of class actions see Stephen E. Morrissey, State
Settlement Class Actions That Release Exclusive Federal Claims: Developing a Framework for
Multijurisdictional Management of Shareholder Litigation, 95 COLUM . L. REV. 1765, 1810 (1995).
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clear the docket.87 Settlements are generally favored,88 and class
settlements are no exception.
Ultimately, court supervision is ineffective in monitoring any element
of class settlements. As Professor Coffee observed almost twenty-five
years ago: “[C]ourts have little ability or incentive to resist the settlements
that the parties in class litigation reach . . . the quest for accountability
must look to other weapons and remedies”. 89
2. Monitoring Settlements Through Class Counsel’s Fees
Another mechanism that may be used as a check on the appropriateness
of class settlements is the requirement that the court approve class
counsel’s fees. Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, class counsel’s fees
must be approved by the court. Parties are obligated to fully disclose any
agreement and any payment made by the defendant to class counsel, 90 as
well as “undertakings that, although seemingly separate, may have
influenced the terms of the settlement by trading away possible
advantages for the class in return for advantages for others”.91 Thus, the
court can be expected to receive information relevant to identifying the
ratio between class counsel’s fees and the class’s recovery.
Class counsel’s fees can be used to align class counsel’s incentives with
those of class members. Specifically, class counsel’s fees can be set as a
percentage of the class’s total recovery.
The first problem with the use of class counsel’s fees as a control
mechanism is that this mechanism addresses only one of the two potential
reasons for the inadequacy of a settlement. Neither the percentage-ofrecovery nor the rule-of-thumb methods are effective when class counsel
mistakenly agrees to a suboptimal settlement. When the case is one of a
sellout, class counsel must be “bribed” by the defendant. Some excessive
payment must be made, resulting in an irregular ratio between class
counsel’s fees and the class’s recovery. But when the settlement is
inappropriate because class counsel has underestimated the value of the
claim itself, the ratio between class counsel’s fees and the class’s recovery
will not be excessive in any way. Thus, controlling class counsel’s fees
cannot address inadequate settlements that stem from class counsel’s

87. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2
J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973).
88. Id.
89. John Coffee. Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1343, 1348 (1995).
90. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3).
91. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23, Committee Notes On Rules – 2003 Amendment (referring to
subdivision (e)(2)).
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mistake, incompetence, or negligence. 92 This severely limits the efficacy
of this mechanism.
The percentage-of-recovery method is ostensibly more effective in
addressing intentional sellouts. And empirical studies have indeed found
that “the amount of client recovery is by far the most important
determinant of the attorney fee amount”,93 and that “the dominance of the
client’s recovery as a determinant of the fee is nearly complete”.94
Upon closer examination, however, the percentage-of-recovery
method is far from a solution to the incentive-alignment problem. First,
the percentage-of-recovery method results in some misalignment, where
additional hours of work are justified from the class’s perspective but not
from the attorney’s perspective. 95 Although socially desirable in the sense
that their marginal utility exceeds their marginal cost, these hours may not
be invested by the attorney, who does not capture the full marginal utility
of these additional hours, but bears their full marginal cost.
Scholars have long observed that the percentage-of-recovery method
incentivizes counsel to settle too early for too little.96 To address the
under-investment problem, an alternative method, known as the lodestar
method,97 may be used. The lodestar method awards class counsel
reasonable fees for a reasonable amount of work when the class has
triumphed in litigation.
As a standalone method, the lodestar method is inadequate because it
makes counsel indifferent to the class’s recovery and even incentivizes
class counsel to overinvest and prolong litigation. 98 But as a
92. Coffee, supra note 89, at 1379.
93. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 4, at 28.
94. Id. See also Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 8, at 249 – 50; Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey
Miller, The Role of Op-outs and Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues,
57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1557, 1563 (2004). A newer study by Eisenberg, Miller and Germano focusing
on 2009 – 2013 finds very similar results. Attorney’s fees were set as a percentage of recovery in 53.61%
of the cases, and in 38.23% of the cases the percentage-of-recovery method was used in combination with
the lodestar method. In total, the percentage-of-recovery mechanism was used in nearly 92% of the cases.
Eisenberg et al., supra note 11, at 945. See also Klement & Ofir, supra note 36, at 2.
95. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 4, at 32.
96. Written Submission of Judge Arlin Adams to the Third Circuit Task Force on Appointment of
Counsel
in
Class
Action
Lawsuits
10
(Mar.
14,
2001),
available
at
https://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/sites/ca3/files/adams1.pdf; Coffee, supra note 89, at 1388.
97. For a survey of these and earlier methods (specifically the multifactor approach, that considers
‘all relevant factors’ including the risk, expertise, reputation and experience of the attorneys, awards in
similar cases, and the like), see Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 4, at 30 – 32.
98. Id. at 31; Charles Silver, Due Process and the Lodestar Method: You Can't Get There from
Here, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1809 (2000). Although in extreme cases the court will not grant class counsel
payment for superfluous hours, it is very difficult to decide ex post precisely what amount of time should
have been spent on a task. Often enough, research that did not yield benefits to the class was reasonable
ex ante. Ex post review of time spent on a case is extremely difficult, and class counsel will normally be
able to provide a compelling justification for investing the declared number of hours (or incurring a
specific expense). In all but the very extreme cases, class counsel can obtain larger rewards by investing
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complementary measure, it may be helpful. The lodestar method may be
used in combination with (and sometimes as a substitute for) the
percentage-of-recovery method to finetune class counsel’s incentives.99
Awarding class counsel a percentage of the class’s recovery while
allowing the court to finetune the amount based on a lodestar method
generally (although imperfectly) aligns class counsel’s incentives with
those of class members.100 But once the need for finetuning is
acknowledged, court supervision again becomes indispensable. This
reintroduces the court’s institutional incompetence to function as an
adversary to the parties before it. Parties can easily persuade the court to
sanction a larger payment to class counsel.
The more important issue with the percentage-of-recovery fee is that
even if the need to finetune fees through the lodestar method is ignored,
court supervision remains essential. A fixed, one-size-fits-all percentage
is insufficient. Some cases are riskier than others. The reward to counsel
must be sensitive to the risk associated with the investment of work ex
ante. If successful cases are not rewarded in a manner that compensates
attorneys for work invested in unsuccessful cases, class actions may never
be brought.101 Innovative class actions will certainly be underincentivized. Additionally, specific cases may require more work than the
average case. Even if the case is not innovative in the sense that it argues
for some novel interpretation of the law, the factual inquiry may be very
costly. Certain cases may require in-depth pre-suit investigations. Class
counsel may have to unearth evidence, interview corporate officers, or
solicit whistleblowers that were privy to wrongdoings. In some areas—
most specifically in securities litigation—the modus operandi of the
plaintiffs’ bar has become to conduct such pre-suit investigations.102 Such
unnecessary time on the case. This is even more problematic in the settlement context, given the lack of
an adversary who may challenge overbilling.
99. Beach, supra note 5, at 491 – 92. Coffee, supra note 3, at 883 – 89. Eisenberg & Miller, supra
note 4, at 32. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers as monitors in Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1273, 1291 (2012) (focusing on non-class mass litigation, but identifying the misalignment problem
in the context of class actions as well); Miller, supra note 42, at 637 (pointing to the inadequacies of each
method in the context of settlement).
100. Olden v. LaFarge Corp., 472 F. Supp. 2d 922 (E.D. Mich. 2007); Supplemental Expert Report,
In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig., No. H-01-3624, 2008 WL 827995 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 18, 2008); Blum v.
Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 900 n.16 (1984); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). As mentioned,
Eisenberg et al. find that between 2009 – 2013 this combination was used in nearly 40% of the cases.
Eisenberg et al., supra note 11.
101. In this respect, class actions are similar to investment in research and development, where the
reward for successful projects (inventions) must compensate for unsuccessful projects. See Ariel Katz,
Making Sense of Nonsense: Intellectual Property, Antitrust, and Market Power, 49 ARIZ. L. R EV. 837,
859 (2007).
102. For a comprehensive account of the development of these pre-complaint investigations as a
response to heightened pleading standards (that are a prerequisite for disclosure) laid down by the PSLRA,
see PSLRA, supra note 22; see also Roy Shapira, Mandatory Arbitration and the Market for Reputation,
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class actions should be encouraged, or at least should not be discouraged.
They contribute to deterrence in greyer areas of law and improve
enforcement when other methods are likely to fail. But a fixed percentage
will attract only those cases in which the fixed percentage is, ex ante,
sufficient to justify the investment; that is, those cases in which the legal
case is straightforward and the facts are easily discovered and proven. 103
A one-size-fits-all percentage is inadequate not only for cases that
deserve larger compensation, but also—naturally—in the opposite
setting. At times, it may be justified to award counsel a percentage that is
smaller than the rule-of-thumb percentage. Specifically, when the
expected amount of work or level of risk is far smaller than the amount of
work and level of risk that would, ex ante, require award of the fixed
percentage, the percentage must be adjusted downward.
If the rule-of-thumb figure becomes a de facto fixed percentage, a
“lemon market” will ensue.104 Attorneys will only bring cases in which
the expected investment or level of risk are smaller than (or equal to) the
amount of investment and level of risk that are justified (ex ante) by the
fixed percentage. Over time, the average risk and average amount of work
will become smaller, and the percentage will need to be adjusted
downward to reflect the new (smaller) average amount of investment and
level of risk. This, in turn, will further reduce the level of risk and amount
of work that are justified ex ante, and so on.
The percentage-of-recovery awarded in a specific case or in a specific
kind of cases must thus be calibrated. As the parties have control over
how the case is presented to the court, they can easily argue that cases
were (ex ante) more complex than they actually were, thereby increasing
class counsel’s fees. Ultimately, the percentage-of-recovery method must
include a significant degree of court discretion. This reintroduces the
court’s incompetence and lack of incentives to act as an adversary to the
parties before it.105
Combining the lodestar method with the percentage-of-fee method
exacerbates the problem. The lodestar method clearly requires a large
degree of court discretion in deciding what amount of time was
reasonable, what hourly-rate is reasonable, etc.
Both setting the percentage-of-recovery and finetuning it with the
99 B.U. L. REV. 873, 895-96 (2019). For a real-life example see Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs
Inc., 437 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2008).
103. See Adams, supra note 96, at 10.
104. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970).
105. Eisenberg et al., supra note 11, at 938. Eisenberg et al.’s article is in fact an attempt to offer
courts some guidance based on a large number of cases. But this will not solve the issue of parties’ ability
to manipulate where the specific case should fall in the given range that can be gleaned from the larger
population of cases.
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lodestar method thus require court discretion. And the parties may lock
arms with respect to both methods. They can agree on, and argue for, a
different percentage;106 they may agree that additional fees are required
to compensate for expenses incurred; the per-hour payment may be
increased;107 or counsel may be allowed to bill additional hours the
defendant may otherwise have contested. 108
Finally, it must be noted that real-life sellouts are likely to result in
relatively minute changes in the percentage-of-recovery argued for by the
parties. Even very small changes to the percentage, which are likely to be
nearly impossible to challenge, may well be extremely lucrative from
class counsel’s perspective. They may thus be sufficient to induce a
sellout that is extremely harmful to class members. To use realistic
figures,109 suppose that a class action settles for $50 million. Further,
suppose that the rule of thumb is that class counsel is awarded twenty
percent of the amount as fees, or $10 million. Suppose that the case is a
relatively easy one, and that class counsel’s efforts, as anticipated ex ante,
justify awarding a fee of fifteen percent of the class’s recovery instead of
the standard twenty percent. If parties argue for fees in the tune of sixteen
percent, the inadequacy may be too fine for the court to notice. It is very
difficult to calibrate a legal rule that is sensitive enough to differentiate
between fifteen and sixteen percent when both figures are significantly
less than the standard. The difference is trivial in terms of ex ante riskassessment. But it increases class counsel’s fees by $500,000. A sellout
remains very lucrative, and thus a very troubling possibility.110 The
general point is that small changes in the percentage-of-recovery that the
court cannot realistically condemn can result in very troubling sellouts.
This analysis should not be taken to suggest that court supervision is of
no value at all. Egregious sellouts may be observable, and the court can
be expected to disapprove settlements in which the sellout is obvious.111
At the very least, when it is clear that very little work has been done and
106. E.g. In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
107. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1990); Student Pub. Interest Research Grp.,
Inc. v. AT&T Bell Labs., 842 F.2d 1436 (3d Cir. 1988); Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 702 F. Supp. 493, 498
(N.J. 1988). See also William R. Mureiko, A Public Goods Approach to Calculating Reasonable Fees
under Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes, 1989 DUKE L. J. 438, 461-72 (1989).
108. Charles Silver, A Restitutionary Theory Of Attorneys' Fees In Class Actions, 76 CORNELL L.
REV. 656 (1991); Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 726-27
(1987).
109. Based on Eisenberg et al.’s research, these seem to be reasonable real-life examples. See
Eisenberg et al., supra note 11, at 938.
110. If the best attainable settlement exceeds $54.6 million, class counsel will earn more by
reaching the best attainable settlement for the class. Of course, if this is the case, the settlement figure
itself can be slightly increased, so that a fee that is somewhere between 19% and 19.75% of the class’s
recovery will make the sellout profitable.
111. E.g. Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
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class counsel is paid a fee that is very large in comparison to the class’s
recovery, the court may notice the inadequacy of the settlement. But even
in the most extreme settings, detection and condemnation are far from
certain. Even if the court is confident that, from a legal perspective, the
case was not a risky one ex ante, it is not at all clear that class counsel has
not performed in-depth research, unearthed evidence, obtained statements
from defendant’s corporate officers, or located other “smoking guns.”
Each of these may be costly and very effective in persuading the
defendant to settle at an earlier time. Instances of generous fees paid early
on may be nothing more than a result of demanding work, for which class
counsel should be adequately compensated. Ultimately, even very
generous compensation for class counsel at an early stage does not
necessarily indicate an inadequate settlement.
Setting class counsel’s fees as a percentage-of-recovery thus fails to
address the inadequacy of class action settlements. First, it is completely
ineffective when the reason for the inadequacy is class counsel’s innocent
mistake and not an intentional sellout. Second, it does not obviate the need
for court discretion in a setting in which the court lacks the ability (and
incentive) to effectively monitor the adequacy of the terms of the
settlement. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the percentageof-recovery method is often combined with the lodestar method. Third,
small changes in the ratio between class counsel’s fees and the class’s
recovery may greatly enrich class counsel, but may, nonetheless, be
practically immune from court condemnation. Finally, even in egregious
sellouts, the percentage-of-recovery method can only serve as a red flag.
Despite its intuitive appeal, the percentage-of-recovery method is a far
cry from an effective control mechanism. The findings according to which
class attorneys often receive excessive fees and class members receive
illusory benefits should come as no surprise.
3. Class Members’ Objections To Proposed Settlements
An alternative (or a supplement) to court supervision is class members’
supervision. Specifically, when class actions settle, class members are
notified of the settlement, and are afforded an opportunity to participate
in a hearing and raise any objection they may have to the settlement.112
Class members can regularly be assumed to have received appropriate
notice of the settlement. For reasons that have to do with personal

112. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). See also, e.g., Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 155 n.3 (3d Cir. 1975);
Greenfield v. Villager Indus., 483 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1973); Edelson PC v. Bandas Law Firm PC, No. 16 C
11057, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122141 (N.D. Ill. July 20, 2018); Pearson v. Target Corp., 893 F.3d 980
(7th Cir.2018).
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jurisdiction and due process,113 courts are vigilant in ensuring that class
members receive proper notice of settlements, even when the costs of
notifying the class are high.114
Nevertheless, class participation remains an ineffective safeguard
against inadequate settlements. Notice to class members guarantees only
that class members know (or can reasonably know) that a settlement has
been reached. But potential awareness of the fact that a settlement has
been reached is insufficient. Class members must also realize that the
terms of the settlement are inadequate and find it worthwhile to act on this
realization. Neither of these is likely, at least with respect to individual
class members.115 Realizing that a settlement is inappropriate requires a
thorough review of the terms of the settlement, a comprehensive legal
analysis of the merits, and an understanding of the evidentiary basis of the
action. A class member is unlikely to undertake this effort given class
members’ trivial individual stakes.
Second, even if class members realize that the terms of the settlement
are inadequate, acting on this realization is costly. Taking action requires
appearing before the court and arguing against the settlement. Class
members’ private gains from taking such action are insufficient to justify
the cost.
In lieu of supervision by individual class members, objectors acting on
behalf of a large number of class members may seemingly serve as a
safeguard against inadequate settlements. These objectors may then be
paid for the value added to the class as a result of their objection.
However, this possibility also provides little comfort.
First, the objector must persuade the court of the inadequacy, against
class counsel’s and defendant’s vigorous objections. Once the parties
have reached a settlement, they naturally do not want the court to reject
it. Even if the objection is valid, the cost of overcoming the parties’
objections may be significant, and the chances are not necessarily
promising. Many objections may not be worth the trouble of filing.
Moreover, the court cannot order the settling parties to agree to an
alternative settlement. It can only reject their settlement or a certain aspect
thereof and order the parties to renegotiate. This, in turn, means that there
is an ever-present risk that the parties will not agree on an alternative
settlement, which reintroduces the issue of the court’s incentive. The

113. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). For a comprehensive account (and an
alternative perspective) see Ryan C. Williams, Due Process, Class Action Opt Outs, and the Right Not to
Sue, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 599 (2015); Hanna, supra note 50, at 1958.
114. E.g. In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297 (N.D. Ga. 1993); In re
Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 289 F.3d 98 (D.C. 2002); Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank,
288 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 2002); But see Leslie, supra note 39, at 76-77.
115. On professional objectors see infra text accompanying notes 118 – 123.
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court should be reluctant to strike down a settlement and risk having to
hear the case. Finally, even when the objection is vindicated, the court
may not view the improvement in the settlement terms as very significant
or may not view the work associated with the objection as very
demanding. The fees awarded by the court may therefore not justify the
objector’s investment.
Second, the improvement in the settlement brought about by objectors
can only be minimal. It is impossible for a court to pinpoint a single figure
that constitutes a fair settlement. The fairness determination requires a
multi-factor analysis, accounting for legal and non-legal considerations
such as the defendant’s sensitivity to the reputation associated with
litigation, the chances of witnesses not appearing at trial, etc. There is thus
a very broad range of reasonable settlements. Some of the factors
impacting the analysis are intangible and cannot be assessed by the court.
Thus, any settlement within the reasonable range, and even some
settlements falling outside this range, will survive court scrutiny. If the
objections sway the court, the settling parties can change the terms of the
settlement to the minimum necessary to pass court scrutiny. Even when
successful, objections can only provide minimal improvements to
settlements, bringing the settlement into the tolerable range. Objections
have no chance of resulting in the best attainable settlement from the
class’s perspective. Settlements remain suboptimal from the class’s
perspective. Additionally, even slight inadequacies may be an opportunity
for a lucrative sellout that imposes a great loss on class members.116
The inadequacy of the post-objection settlement, a formidable issue in
its own right, exacerbates the first issue of the objector’s cost-benefit
analysis. If objectors can only push settlements into the tolerable range,
the value added to the class is smaller and the objector can only hope to
receive relatively small fees, derived from the difference between the
original settlement and the minimally tolerable settlement. This chills the
incentives to undertake the uphill battle of filing the objection in the first
place, even disregarding the court’s incentives.
Therefore, objections are helpful only in very grossly inappropriate
settlements and can never result in the best possible settlement.
Objections provide a very limited solution to the inadequacy of
settlements.
Not surprisingly, the reality is that objections—or, more accurately, the
potential for abuse of objections—have become a problem for adequate
settlements rather than a solution for inadequate ones.117
116. See supra text accompanying notes 109 – 110.
117. Barnes v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. 01-10395-NG, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71072, at *3 (D.
Mass. Aug. 22, 2006); But see Eric Alan Isaacson, A Real-World Perspective on Withdrawal of Objections
to Class Action Settlements and Attorney’s Fee Awards: Reflections on the Proposed Revisions to Federal

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021

25

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 3

2021]

LAWYERS ON AUCTION

369

The possibility of filing an objection has also attracted what have come
to be known as “professional objectors.”118 The practice of professional
objections entails filing a meritless objection to class settlements on
behalf of unnamed class members. When the court approves the
settlement despite the objection, the professional objector appeals the
ruling.119 The objector does not typically intend to see the appeal
through.120 The appeal imposes litigation costs as well as the costs of
delay in execution of the settlement on the settling parties. This allows the
professional objector to extract a payoff from class counsel and the
defendant in return for withdrawing the appeal. At times, even an appeal
is unnecessary. Sometimes, the delay caused by filing an objection with
the district court is enough to extract a payment.121 Professional objectors
have been characterized as “pariah[s] to the functionality of class action
lawsuits”.122
Rather than solving the problem of settlement inadequacy, the
possibility of filing an objection has become “what is effectively a tax on
class action settlements, a tax that has no benefit to anyone other than to
the objectors.”123
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(5), 10 ELON L. REV. 35 (2018). As the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
noted: “Although [such] payment may advance class interests in a particular case, allowing payment
perpetuates a system that can encourage objections advanced for improper purposes.” BOLCH JUD. I NST.,
supra note 66, at 20.
118. John E. Lopatka & D. Brooks Smith, Class Action Professional Objectors: What to Do About
Them?, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 865, 867-70 (2012). For an opposing view see Isaacson, id., at 35.
119. The Supreme Court has ruled that such non-named class members are a ‘party’ to the action,
and therefore have a right to appeal the decision. Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 14 (2002). As Lopatka
and Smith note, the case may have been decided differently had the action not been one brought under
Rule 23(b)(1) that does not afford class members the opportunity to opt out of the class. Lopatka & Smith,
id., at 868).
120. Lopatka & Smith, id., at 868.
121. Vollmer v. Selden, 350 F.3d 656, 660 (7th Cir. 2003).
122. Snell v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., Civ. No. 97-2784 RLE, 2000 WL 1336640, at *9 (D.
Minn. Sept. 8, 2000). See also references in Lopatka & Smith, supra note 118, at 866, 869.
123. Barnes v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. 01-10395-NG, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71072, at *3 (D.
Mass. Aug. 22, 2006). But see Isaacson, supra note 117. The recent amendments to the Federal Rules of
Procedure that came into force in late 2018 attempt to address these concerns by limiting settling parties’
ability to pay off objectors. Such payments must be disclosed, and require court approval. FED. R. CIV. P.
23(e)(5)(B). See also BOLCH JUD. INST., supra note 66, at 20 – 30. Following these amendments,
objections are less attractive as a mean to extract payments from the settling parties.
But this does not rectify the problem. First, the amendments do not address the problems associated with
filing genuine objections. It is still costly to file genuine objections, and these objections can only drive
settlements into the tolerable range, not optimize them. The recent amendments may change the ratio of
good-faith to bad-faith objections changes, but will not rectify the inadequacy of settlements. Perhaps
even more importantly, the amended rules do not truly eliminate the possibility of payoffs to the objector.
The requirement for court approval of the terms of any agreement between the settling parties and the
objector suffers from the same deficiencies that court approval of the original class settlement suffers
from. Class counsel, the defendant and the objector can easily join forces. Class counsel and the defendant
may apply minimal changes to the settlement, present the objector’s role in improving the settlement as
such that justifies a generous reward, and file for approval of the amended settlement with a payment to
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4. Opt Outs
The last way to theoretically address the inadequacy of settlements is
the opt out mechanism. This mechanism is similar to objections in that it
relies on class members rather than on courts to supervise settlements.
When class members are notified of the settlement, they may opt out of
the class whether or not they had a chance to opt out of the class at an
earlier stage.124
Opting out of the class indirectly addresses the adequacy of class
settlements. Opt outs make the settlement less attractive from the
defendant’s perspective because the class bound by res judicata is
smaller. If a large enough number of class members opts out of the class,
class counsel and the defendant may renegotiate a more appropriate
settlement. Indeed, many class settlements contain a provision making the
settlement contingent on a certain percentage of class members not opting
out.125
However, this mechanism too is ineffective. First, much like filing an
objection, opting out requires that class members not only know that a
settlement has been reached, but also incur the costs of reviewing the
settlement itself and the underlying evidence and legal argumentation in
order to realize that the settlement is inadequate. 126
Second, although it is relatively easy to opt out of a class (as opposed
to objecting to a settlement, which is costly), focusing on the ease of
opting out is myopic. If the class member does not intend to pursue her
individual cause of action separately, she is better off not opting out of
the class at all. It is far better to receive inadequate compensation than to
receive no compensation at all. Opting out can only function as a check
on the appropriateness of settlements if opting-out class members
subsequently file their own suit.127 And filing a class member’s individual
the objector. The three parties will argue that the objection has been addressed and justifies remuneration.
The previous issues with court supervision will resurface, and it will still be possible to “make a living
simply by filing frivolous appeals.” Barnes, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71072, at *3.
124. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1). For an analysis of the necessity of notice to class members for this
purpose, as well as the shift from an opt-in rule to an opt-out rule in 1996 see Amchem Prods. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591, 614-15, 628-29 (1997). See also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985);
Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 392 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 117 (1994).
125. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 94, at 1538. For a report on such a provision in the recent multibillion credit-card settlement recent case see Jennifer Surane, Visa, Mastercard Face Next Fight After $6.2
Billion Settlement, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-0918/visa-mastercard-reach-6-2-billion-settlement-over-swipe-fees.
126. For this argument in the specific context of opt-outs, see Geoffrey P. Miller, Conflicts of
Interest in Class Action Litigation: An Inquiry into the Appropriate Standard, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL
REFORM 581, 586.
127. Settlement in Blockbuster class-action suit approved, THE VICTORIA ADVOC., Jan. 13, 2002,
at C1 (noting that 500 approximately customers had opted out of the settlement and could bring their own
suit, but that this was impractical given the small amounts to which individual customers were entitled).
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suit is, of course, even more costly than filing an objection. Not
surprisingly, empirical studies and anecdotal evidence suggest that the
number of opt outs is in the vicinity of one to two percent—possibly even
less.128 When opting out occurs, it is often for strategic reasons. Larger
class members, for example institutional investors in securities class
actions, can often extract greater compensation from the defendant129 not
because they have a better case than other class members,130 but because
they can make a more credible threat to pursue the case or because the
defendant is worried about its ongoing relationship with these important
customers. Although this would seem to increase the total amount paid
out to the class, it in fact allows the defendant to reduce the total
payment.131 The original class is left with no member that has any
significant interest in the outcome.132 The dispersed class members
subsidize the larger payments made to those large consumers who can
credibly threaten the defendant with litigation, or with whom the
defendant wants to maintain an amicable relationship.
Finally, not all class actions can be opted out of. There are three types
of class actions from which members cannot opt out: class actions seeking
injunctive or declaratory relief;133 class actions that are certified because
separate trials would create the risk of inconsistent adjudication; 134 and
“limited fund” class actions, which may be allowed because if tried
separately the lawsuits might be “dispositive of the interests of the other
members . . . or would substantially impair or impede their ability to

128. Jay Tidmarsh & David Betson, Optimal Class Size, Opt-Out Rights, and "Indivisible"
Remedies, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 542, 544 (2011); Thomas E. Willging et al., Empirical Study Of Class
Actions In Four Federal District Courts: Final Report To The Advisory Committee On Civil Rules, FED.
JUD. CTR. 1, 21 (1996); Jay Tidmarsh, Mass Tort Settlement Class Actions: Five Case Studies, FED. JUD.
CTR.1, 10-11 (1998).
129. Tidmarsh & Betson, id, at 544; Tidmarsh, id., at 39; Reed R. Kathrein, Opt-Outs, MFNs and
Game Theory: Can the High Multiples Achieved by Opt-Outs in Recent Mega-Fraud Settlements
Continue, A Discussion Draft, in SEC. LITIG. & ENFORCEMENT I NST. 583,587 – 590 (PLI Corp. L. &
Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. B-1620, 2007); Kessler, Topaz, Meltzer, Check LLP, Opt-Out
Lawsuits Advantages and Considerations, (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.ktmc.com/blog/opt-out-lawsuitadvantages-and-considerations; Shepherd, Finkelman, Miller, & Shah, LLP, Opt-Out Litigation,
https://www.sfmslaw.com/securities-regulation-corporate-governance/opt-out-litigations/ (last visited
Oct. 10, 2020).
130. Which would have raised a conflict of interest between class members in the first place. See
Miller, supra note 126, at 586.
131. See Surane, supra note 125.
132. On the importance of institutional investors specifically, and larger class members generally,
see supra the discussion in notes 22 & 47. The larger consumers are important class members, because
their larger stakes make monitoring of class counsel more likely. But their ability (and propensity) to
‘abandon ship’ is the negative side of the same observation.
133. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). See also Bratcher v. Nat’l Standard Life Ins. Co. (In re Monumental
Life Ins. Co.), 365 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 2004).
134. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A). See also Corley v. Entergy Corp., 222 F.R.D. 316 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
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protect their interests.”135 For these types of class actions, the possibility
of opting out is not even a hypothetical safeguard. 136
5. The Inadequacy Of Existing Mechanisms–Summary
Ultimately, none of the existing mechanisms provides a safeguard
against inadequate class settlements. The two mechanisms that rely on
court supervision are ineffective mainly due to the court’s inability to act
as an adversary to the parties before it. And the two mechanisms that rely
on class members taking action are ineffective mainly due to class
members’ lack of individual incentive to take any action at all. The
findings according to which “too many cases are settled with illusory
benefits to class members and large fees for lawyers”,137 and the
numerous examples of such cases, 138 should come as no surprise.
III. THE PROPOSED METHOD–AUCTIONING APPOINTMENT AS CLASS
COUNSEL
This Article proposes a post-settlement auction of the appointment as
class counsel, a mechanism which spontaneously guarantees the
adequacy of settlements.
A. The Basic Mechanism
Once a settlement has been reached, the right to step in as class counsel
is auctioned. The minimum bid is the amount the defendant is to pay
original class counsel in accordance with the settlement. The highest
bidder pays original class counsel the amount bid and is appointed as class
counsel. Newly-appointed counsel may then pursue the case as it deems
fit. She may adjudicate the case, renegotiate a settlement with the
defendant, or combine the two by continuing to litigate the case and
settling with the defendant at a later stage.
There is only one limitation on new class counsel’s fees: the ratio
between class recovery and class counsel’s fees remains as it was in the
original settlement. New class counsel’s only way to receive more than
she paid original class counsel is to increase the class’s recovery.
135. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B). See also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 833 (1999). See
also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(4).
136. This last qualification may not be as significant as it might seem on first blush, because these
types of class actions are far less frequent than “classic” class actions governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
But nonetheless, this is another limitation on the efficacy of opt-outs as a mechanism for assuring the
adequacy of settlements.
137. U.S. CHAMBER I NSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, UNSTABLE FOUNDATION, supra note 1, at 2.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 24 – 32.
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Theoretically, the process of ex post auctioning of appointment as class
counsel may be repeated indefinitely. If new class counsel reaches a
second settlement with the defendant, the process is repeated until a
settlement is reached after which no bids are received for appointment as
class counsel. As this Section will illustrate, because the right to act as
class counsel is auctioned, there should normally be no need for more than
a single auction. But as a purely theoretical matter, the process may be
repeated.
Importantly, the court need not devote any resources to the excruciating
and ineffective attempt to assess the adequacy of the settlement. It also
need not review of the appropriateness of class counsel’s fees. Neither of
these needs to be looked into by the court. The court need not review them
when the settlement is first presented. And it need not review them at any
subsequent stage, including the final stage, when the court sanctions the
final settlement. The court simply relies on the market to spontaneously
correct any inadequacy, and sanctions the last settlement presented to it,
when no one else is willing to bid for appointment as class counsel.
This method provides the optimal result regardless of the reason for the
settlement’s inadequacy. Whether class counsel has intentionally received
a (legal) kickback in return for selling out the class, or unintentionally
negotiated a bad deal for the class, the market will self-correct.
To demonstrate this, assume—as in the numeric example presented in
the Introduction of this Article—that a settlement is reached according to
which class members receive $100, and class counsel is paid ten dollars
in fees.
We may begin with the possibility that class counsel has
unintentionally negotiated a suboptimal deal. Class counsel does not
realize that the defendant is actually willing to pay the class $300. The
defendant may be willing to pay $300 because the case’s legal foundation
is stronger than class counsel realizes, because the evidence contains a
“smoking gun” that class counsel has not noticed, or simply because the
defendant is concerned with the costs of litigation and the reputational
costs associated with such litigation, such as negative press coverage. Any
attorney identifying this inadequacy would be willing to bid for the right
to receive the difference in fees. Original class counsel has done all the
work and new class counsel simply pays ten dollars to immediately
approach the defendant with an offer to settle for $300, and receive thirty
dollars in fees. Potential class counsel would be willing to pay anything
up to thirty dollars for the right to step in as class counsel. Original class
counsel is no worse off than she was under the original settlement if she
is paid exactly ten dollars, or better off if she is paid anything more than
ten dollars. The transaction is Pareto efficient from the perspective of both
original class counsel and new class counsel. Importantly, class members
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will ultimately receive $300 instead of $100.
Now suppose that, although newly appointed class counsel is a better
negotiator than original class counsel, he is not the best negotiator on the
plaintiffs’ bar. After purchasing the right to act as class counsel for ten
dollars, he quickly settles the case for $150, receiving a fee of fifteen
dollars. A more vigilant negotiator can then be expected to step in, pay
second class counsel fifteen dollars, and negotiate a better deal for the
class and for herself.
In reality, the auction process will likely not need to be repeated. This
is because the right to act as class counsel is auctioned and any law firm
or individual lawyer can participate in the auction and bid. Competition
amongst law firms to purchase the right to act as class counsel should thus
drive up the bid in the first round of the auction. The price paid for the
right to act as class counsel in the first auction should be equal to (or
marginally lower than) the fee that can be expected when the best possible
settlement is negotiated. In the previous example, law firms can be
expected to bid up to thirty dollars for the right to act as class counsel,
and then negotiate the $300 settlement with the defendant. Once the
second settlement is reached, there should be no one willing to bid for
appointment as class counsel. But at least in theory, cases may exist in
which only one potential bidder realizes the true value of acting as class
counsel and the price paid to original class counsel is only marginally
higher than (or equal to) what the defendant would have paid original
class counsel. Even if this is the case, future auctions can be expected to
rectify any inappropriateness.
For example, suppose that, in the same setting of the previous numeric
example, only one law firm notices a smoking gun in the evidence. It
realizes that the value of acting as class counsel is thirty dollars, but it
only bids ten dollars because it does not expect competition for the right
to act as class counsel. If this first bidder (new class counsel) is
subsequently willing to take measures to extract the full settlementpotential ($300), the class’s recovery will be optimal. The class will have
received the full obtainable amount of $300, original class counsel (who
missed the smoking gun) will have been paid ten dollars, and the second
class counsel will have been paid thirty dollars, for a profit of $20. If,
however, the first bidder (second class counsel) is unwilling or unable to
incur the hardships of an additional round of negotiations with the
defendant, it can then reveal the inadequacy of the settlement and
reauction the right to act as class counsel, which could this time be
expected to be sold for thirty dollars, as its true value has become known
to all. Once the right to act as class counsel has been purchased, the first
bidder has little reason not to reveal the inadequacy of the settlement. It
wants to resell the asset that is now in its possession—the right to act as
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class counsel—and has everything to gain and nothing to lose from
potential bidders realizing the true value of this asset. Therefore, even if
the first round of the auction does not yield the best-attainable result,
subsequent rounds will. But in reality, the first auction should yield the
optimal result.
This method provides even more comfort in cases of an intentional
sellout—the case in which class counsel realizes that the settlement is
suboptimal from the class’s perspective, but is “bribed” by the defendant
to agree to it. If original class counsel receives a “bribe”, the method
essentially guarantees the same “bribe” (measured as a percentage of the
class’s total recovery) to all future class counsel as well. Assume, as in
the previous example, that the best obtainable settlement is $300 and that
the fair fee for class counsel is ten percent of the class’s recovery.
However, defendant and class counsel agree to a $200 settlement for the
class, and fifty dollars as class counsel’s fees. The immediate implication
is that class counsel’s fees are fixed at twenty-five percent of the class’s
recovery, whatever that recovery may ultimately be. The value of acting
as class counsel instantly becomes seventy-five dollars: twenty-five
percent of the true value of the claim–$300. The larger the “bribe”, or the
more egregious the sellout, the more lucrative it becomes to purchase the
right to act as class counsel.
The more conspicuous the sellout, the more likely it is that other law
firms will notice the inadequacy of the settlement. The settling parties
cannot manipulate this. If class counsel’s fees are set too low, original
class counsel will not agree to the settlement. It will prefer to insist on a
better one or pursue the case. If fees are set too high, they become a call
for others to purchase the right to act as class counsel. As long as there
are no undisclosed side payments, which would be illegal (and would
require both parties to submit falsified statements),139 the mechanism
cannot be manipulated.
There is, of course, no reason to force new class counsel to settle the
case immediately after purchasing the right to act as class counsel. To be
sure, normally a new settlement can be expected to be reached shortly
after the right to act as class counsel has been purchased. New class
counsel will have presumably identified the inadequacy of the original
settlement, suggesting that the current value of the claim exceeds the
amount agreed to by the defendant. Otherwise, new class counsel would
not have purchased the right to act as class counsel. This, in turn, implies
that the defendant can be quickly persuaded to settle for a larger amount.
Even if the reason for the inadequacy of the settlement is one that may
only come into play at a later stage in litigation—for example, a “smoking
139. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3).
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gun” missed by both original class counsel and the defendant—new class
counsel can reveal this to the defendant immediately after purchasing the
right to act as class counsel and update the defendant’s assessment of the
outcome of the case. Thereafter, class counsel can quickly negotiate a
better deal for the class.140 Therefore, it is likely that settled class actions
will resettle shortly after the right to act as class counsel has been
purchased.
But if, for whatever reason, new class counsel finds it profitable to
adjudicate the case, there is no reason to prohibit her from doing so.
Original class counsel will have already been paid for her efforts up to the
settlement. The amount paid will be at least the amount original class
counsel agreed to receive within the framework of the settlement, so there
is no concern that this payment is inadequate compensation for these
efforts. New class counsel will have internalized these costs because it
will have paid original class counsel this amount. And the class is well
protected because new class counsel can only make a profit if the class’s
recovery is increased.
To be sure, if new class counsel ultimately loses the case, the class will
have lost. But this is not unique to settlements or to the proposed
mechanism. Class members are always exposed to the risk of class
counsel losing the case. And under the proposed method, class counsel
has more skin in the game than it usually does. Normally, if the case is
lost, class counsel loses the time spent on the case. By contrast, under the
proposed mechanism, class counsel will have lost not only the time spent
on the case, but also the payment made to original class counsel. Class
counsel is incentivized to carefully assess the merits of the case and
professionally adjudicate it to a far greater extent than class counsel
normally is.
B. The Ex Ante Effect of the Method–Securing the Adequacy of the First
Settlement
This Article has thus far focused on the expected response of law
firms of the plaintiffs’ bar to inadequate settlements. But of course the
threat of the ex post auction should work back to the original (first)
settlement and guarantee its adequacy.
If a defendant “bribes” class counsel in the first settlement, the lowball settlement (from class members’ perspective) is sure to attract
bidders, as purchasing the right to act as class counsel becomes a lucrative
investment opportunity. Ultimately, the settlement will be more costly for

140. This is a straightforward extension of the shadow-of-trial model. See Robert H. Mnookin &
Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Y ALE L.J. 950 (1979).
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the defendant than a fair original settlement would have been. It will
ultimately pay the class the fair value of the settlement and pay fees that
are greater than it would have otherwise paid. Defendant thus has an
incentive to reach a fair first settlement, in which class counsel’s fees are
not excessive. At the same time, class counsel has little reason to agree to
a suboptimal settlement. Therefore, class counsel can be expected to
negotiate the best attainable settlement in order to extract the largest fees
possible. This method should normally result in the first settlement being
the best possible one.
In any event, courts never need to review the terms of class settlements.
Whether the first settlement is the best attainable one and no firm is
willing to bid for appointment as class counsel or some subsequent
settlement is the best attainable one, the court applies a simple process
that never requires any substantive review: it continues to auction the right
to act as class counsel every time a new settlement is reached, awarding
this right to the highest bidder. Once there are no bids for appointment as
class counsel, it sanctions the most recent settlement.
C. Eliminating The ‘Reverse Auction’ Problem
The method proposed in this Article also solves the “reverse auction”
problem. The reverse auction is a result of competition between different
attorneys of the plaintiffs’ bar to be appointed as class counsel. At times,
different attorneys will file certification motions in different courts
against the same defendant or defendants, alleging similar causes of
action on behalf of identical or similar classes. This is extremely common
when class actions are filed in the wake a scandal.141 This results in
competition between counsel for appointment as class counsel. In such
settings, the Rules of Civil Procedure require courts to appoint the
applicant “best able to represent the interests of the class”.142 Much of
courts’ resources at the earlier stages of class actions are devoted to
resolving this rivalry, and the courts are forced to consider numerous
intangible factors such as experience, willingness and ability to commit
to time-consuming litigation, willingness to cooperate with other counsel,
access to resources to litigate in a timely manner, and any other relevant
factors.143 Different courts use different methods. At times, courts appoint
different lead counsels for each putative class. Sometimes, multiple firms

141. Pretrial Order No. 2: Application for Appointment of Plaintiffs’ Lead Counsel and Steering
Committee Members, In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Marketing, Sales Practices, and Prods. Liab.
Litig., 148 F. Supp. 3d 1367 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2015) (MDL No. 2672).
142. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(2).
143. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(a)(i) – (iv), (g)(1)(b).
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are appointed as class counsel and steering committees are established.144
Often, the need arises to appoint interim class counsel until courts render
a final decision on the appointment of class counsel.145
This process is demanding and requires coordination between the
various courts in which the certification motions are filed. This
coordination problem can be abused by both class counsel and the
defendant. One of the ways in which a firm competing with others can
secure its appointment as class counsel is by reaching a settlement with
the defendant and having the agreement sanctioned by the relevant court.
A reverse auction occurs when the defendant uses competition among
firms of the plaintiffs’ bar to obtain a low-ball settlement. As the court in
Reynolds observed:
[T]he defendant in a series of class actions picks the most ineffectual class
lawyers to negotiate a settlement with in the hope that the district court will
approve a weak settlement that will preclude other claims against the
defendant.146

The ex post auction mechanism rectifies the reverse auction problem.147
If the reverse auction pushes the price of the first settlement down, the
subsequent auctions will drive it back up. The simple mechanism this
Article proposes guarantees that the best possible settlement from the
class’s perspective will ultimately be negotiated. The terms of the first
settlement become a moot issue.
D. Applicability of The Method To Coupon Settlements
The application of the method to coupon settlements, in which class
members receive coupons for future purchases from the defendant, is not
immediately apparent. Nonetheless, the mechanism is very easily applied
to coupon settlements as well.
Before proceeding to explain how the method can be applied to coupon
settlements, it is important to note that coupon settlements are a valuable
tool. Although coupon settlements may be abused, as demonstrated in the
preceding Sections, they can also significantly increase the value class
members receive in a settlement. If the cost of a coupon to the defendant
is lower than the value of the coupon to class members, paying class
members in the form of coupons will allow class members to receive
greater value than they would have received in a cash settlement. 148
144. BOLCH JUD. I NST., supra note 66, at 31 – 35.
145. Id. at 33.
146. Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 2002).
147. For the significant resources devoted to such scrutiny see Figueroa v. Sharper Image Corp.,
517 F. Supp. 2d 1292 (S.D. Fla. 2007).
148. This will be the case even the coupon redemption-rate is 100%; that is, all class members
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Settings in which the value of the coupon to class members exceeds the
cost of the coupon to the defendant seem to be relatively common.
Whenever the defendant produces the product or provides the service for
which the coupons can be used, the cost to the defendant of the coupons
is smaller than their value to purchasers (or class members). If coupons
have additional benefits from the defendant’s perspective, for example
because they serve as a promotion for the defendant’s products,149 the
defendant may again be willing to pay a larger amount in coupons than it
is willing to pay in cash.
Generally, coupon settlements may be a way to increase class
members’ total benefits from the settlement. The real issue with coupon
settlements is not that coupons are inherently under-compensatory, but
that their redemption rate may be too low. Calculating the value of the
settlement by multiplying the number of class members by the coupons’
face value may largely overstate the real value of the settlement to the
class. Class counsel and the defendant may intentionally set the face value
of the coupon to be small enough to ensure that redemption rates remain
low. This manipulation allows class counsel and the defendant to abuse
coupon settlements.
To address this, the proposed mechanism can simply be applied based
on the face value of a single coupon, rather than on the purported class
recovery. The ratio fixed by the first settlement would not be the ratio of
class counsel’s fees to total class recovery. Rather, it would be the ratio
of class counsel’s fees to the face value of the coupons. If the face value
of the coupons has been set too low, the defendant will be willing to
increase the face value of the coupons because the true value of the
settlement to the defendant is much higher. If this happens, new class
counsel can significantly increase its own fees.
Consider the extreme example of the ITT Financial Corporation
settlement.150 In the framework of the settlement, class members were
awarded coupons. Only two of the 96,754 coupons—or 0.002 percent—
were redeemed. Class counsel’s fees were calculated based on the value
of nearly 100,000 coupons.151 The defendant would clearly have been
willing to increase the face value of the coupons by orders of magnitude.
Increasing the face value of the coupons would have had a double effect.
First, it would have increased the amount recovered by those class
members who redeemed their coupons. Second, it would have
redeem all of the coupons.
149. As some have argued was the case in the ITT case, subsequently discussed. See Hantler &
Norton, supra note 25, at 3 (citing Barry Meier, Math of a Class-Action Suit: “Winning” $2.19 Costs
$91.33, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1995). See also Rhode, supra note 24, at 465.
150. Id.
151. See supra note 27.
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presumably increased redemption rates. But even if the face-value of the
coupons were increased tenfold, it is hard to believe that this would have
made the settlement cost-prohibitive from the defendant’s perspective.
And new class counsel would have received ten times what original class
counsel received. Similarly, in the Blockbuster settlement, in which class
members received a coupon for a one-dollar discount on rentals,152 even
if the defendant could only have been persuaded to increase the face-value
of the coupons to $1.25, new class counsel could have earned nearly $2.5
million—(twenty-five percent of original class counsel’s fees. Clearly,
this would have been incentive enough to renegotiate a deal that was
unattractive to class members.
Precisely assessing the effect of an increase in coupon face-value may
be slightly more complicated than assessing the effect of an increase in
the amount of cash settlements because it requires considering two
elements rather than one. Potential bidders for appointment as class
counsel must consider both the increased per-class-member payment and
the effect on redemption rates. But this is done anyway. All parties to a
settlement obviously engage in estimating these effects as it is.
Defendants necessarily engage in such an estimate because it affects their
total exposure. And class counsel necessarily engages in such an estimate,
because even under the current regime, higher face-value means greater
fees.153 Parties obviously assess the true costs and benefits of coupon
settlements under the current regime as well, and would-be bidders have
a strong incentive to identify inadequate settlements.
In fact, if coupon settlements are indeed abused, the proposed
mechanism will likely be a very effective tool in securing their adequacy.
As explained in the context of cash settlements, 154 the more extreme the
level of under-compensation, the higher the profitability of being
appointed as class counsel. If coupon settlements allow parties to conceal
the settlements’ inadequacies from the court, potential bidders have an
offsetting incentive to discover and reveal such inadequacies. If the truly
extreme sellouts occur in coupon settlements, it should be easy enough
for attorneys of the plaintiffs’ bar to identify gross inadequacies.
Returning to the ITT Financial Corporation settlement, it seems nearly
certain that ITT could have easily been persuaded to increase the face
value of the coupons tenfold. Given the redemption-rate of less than
0.002%, this seems like an extremely moderate assumption. And this
would have meant a 900% return on the investment of any attorney who
identified the inadequacy. This seems to be a very strong incentive to get
152. See supra note 31.
153. Because this allows the parties to present the settlement as providing class members with larger
recovery – see supra notes 93 – 94.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 33 – 34.
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involved in the case.
Finally, the costs of a mistaken assessment are unlikely to be extreme
from new class counsel’s perspective. Even if, for whatever reason, new
class counsel miscalculates the defendant’s willingness when bidding,
and ultimately finds that it cannot negotiate a higher coupon-face-value,
its loss can easily be cut. When new class counsel realizes that it cannot
negotiate a better settlement, it can quickly resort to the terms of the
original settlement. New class counsel will have paid original class
counsel’s fees but received the same fees from the defendant. It will have
lost nothing in terms of out-of-pocket funds. To be sure, it will have lost
the time invested in negotiating a better settlement. But this hardly seems
like an extreme cost and will only be borne if class counsel somehow
miscalculated the best attainable settlement. Law firms of the plaintiffs’
bar may also develop a practice of obtaining portfolios of coupon
settlements in which they attempt to renegotiate. Given the relatively low
costs of the unprofitable cases (time spent before resorting to the original
settlement), it is likely that improving settlement terms in some of the
firm’s portfolio will make the whole endeavor profitable.
Ultimately, the method is applicable to coupon settlements as well. It
may, in fact, be even more powerful in this setting if indeed coupon
settlements often conceal grave mistreatments of the class.
E. Limitations
The method proposed in this Article has two limitations that must be
acknowledged.
1. Coupon Settlements Followed By Cash Settlements
The first limitation of this Article’s proposed method is that it cannot
automatically rectify settings in which there is a “change of currency”
between the first and second settlements. Specifically, if the first
settlement is a coupon settlement and the second settlement is a cash
settlement, the conversion rate of coupon to cash cannot be set
automatically.
Consider a coupon settlement, according to which 100 class members
are to receive 100 one-dollar coupons. The settling parties also agree that
class counsel will be paid ten dollars in fees. A law firm of the plaintiffs’
bar realizes that only a small percentage of the coupons, say five percent,
will be redeemed, given their trivial value. The firm purchases the right
to act as class counsel for ten dollars–the fee negotiated by original class
counsel. It then settles the case for a forty-dollar cash payment to class
members. New class counsel’s fees cannot be set based on the ratio set in
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the original settlement.
This limitation is not significant. First, there is no reason to think that
such an odd setting is very realistic. Why would the second settlement be
a cash settlement if the first settlement was a coupon settlement? Nothing
prevents second class counsel from reaching a better coupon settlement.
Keeping the “currency” of the settlement as “coupon currency” will allow
new class counsel to improve the settlement from the class’s perspective
and increase its own payment. In the previous example, if the defendant
is willing to settle for forty dollars in cash, and if indeed class members
would have only redeemed five dollars in coupons under the original
settlement, the defendant will presumably be willing to increase the face
value of the coupons. This will allow new class counsel to receive a quick
return on its investment, while at the same time improving class recovery.
And as previously discussed, coupon settlements are not objectionable per
se. When the face value of the coupons is appropriate, they add value to
the class. New class counsel is fully motivated to reach a second coupon
settlement, and at the end of the day class members should be no worse
off than they would have been under a cash settlement.
Moreover, not all potential bidders must be able to reach a better
coupon settlement for the method to provide spontaneous supervision of
the adequacy of the coupon settlement. As long as there are any attorneys
on the plaintiffs’ bar that can reach a better coupon settlement (i.e., higher
coupon face value), the method will work perfectly. These attorneys will
bid for appointment as class counsel and will ultimately achieve the
optimal settlement from the class’s perspective. And of course, the
possibility of such bidders will work back to the original settlement and
secure its adequacy. Thus, the only settlements that pose an issue are those
where no attorney believes it can improve as a coupon settlement. And if
no attorney can improve the settlement as a coupon settlement, the
settlement is probably not grossly inadequate.
For this limitation to be meaningful in any way, two extremely unlikely
conditions must be met. First, all potential bidders of the plaintiffs’ bar
must believe that they cannot improve the settlement in any way as a
coupon settlement. Second, although none can improve the settlement as
a coupon settlement, some must believe that they can improve the
settlement as a cash settlement, otherwise the settlement is by definition
the best attainable settlement.
Therefore, this limitation does not seem of any practical significance.
But, indeed, if these two conditions are ever met, the method will not
guarantee perfect and spontaneous supervision.
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2. Smaller Class Recovery and (Much) Smaller Fees for Class Counsel
Another limitation of the method is that it fails to incentivize a specific
type of attorney to bid for appointment as class counsel. Specifically, the
method will not attract bids from an attorney who can only obtain a
smaller overall settlement (because, for example, she is slightly less
competent), but is nonetheless willing to accept a smaller fee, leaving
class members with a larger net recovery.
Consider the following scenario. First class counsel settles the case for
$100, of which ten dollars are paid as fees, and class members’ net
recovery is ninety dollars. Any attorney who can obtain more than a total
of $100 will be incentivized to bid for appointment as class counsel.
However, there may also be attorneys who can only achieve a total
recovery of ninety-five dollars, but are nonetheless satisfied with only
four dollars as fees. If such an attorney is appointed, class members will
be left with a larger net recovery of ninety-one dollars instead of ninety
dollars. But such an attorney will not find it worthwhile to bid for
appointment as class counsel because she can only make a profit if she
increases the class’s total recovery.155
This limitation is also not troubling. First, while such a settlement may
leave class members with a larger net compensation, it is not necessarily
more socially desirable. This is because such a settlement achieves more
by way of corrective justice for class members, but less in terms of
deterrence. The defendant ultimately pays less under such a settlement
than under the original settlement (ninety-five dollars instead of $100),
which results in under-deterrence.156 This must be the case, because if the
defendant was to ultimately pay more under the second settlement, second
class attorney would have found it lucrative to bid for appointment as
class counsel. Therefore, only subsequent settlements which sacrifice
deterrence will not be incentivized by the method.
Second, while this method cannot indeed incentivize the less-ablemore-generous attorney, it will incentivize all more-able-equallygenerous attorneys. And in this sense, it guarantees profitability for an
extremely large number of firms of the plaintiffs’ bar. As long as there
are attorneys capable of achieving more for class members, sellouts and
genuine mistakes will indeed be rectified.

155. I thank Ehud Guttel for pressing me on this point.
156. For a review of the various goals of tort law (focusing specifically on deterrence and corrective
justice) see Ariel Porat, The Many Faces Of Negligence, 4 THEORETICAL I NQUIRIES IN LAW 105 (2003).
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III. A THEORETICAL ALTERNATIVE – FULL PURCHASE OF THE CLASS’S
CAUSE OF ACTION
A theoretical alternative to the method developed in this Article is the
auctioning of the class’s right of action itself. Rather than bidding for the
right to act as class counsel, the class’s entire cause of action may be
auctioned for the full amount agreed to by the defendant (i.e., the sum of
the class’s recovery and class counsel’s fees). The new purchaser would
then pay class members the amount they were to be paid in accordance
with the terms of the settlement. The purchaser would also pay original
class counsel its fees, as agreed in the settlement. Having internalized the
full costs of the case up to that point, the purchaser could then be allowed
to proceed and handle the action as it deemed fit, with no additional
limitation. It could retain original class counsel to act on its behalf, hire
different counsel, settle, or adjudicate.157 There would be no need to place
any additional limitations.
The full-purchase alternative is nonetheless problematic in two
important respects. First, the full-purchase option addresses only one of
the two goals of class actions. Class actions aim not only to deter
wrongdoers, but also to compensate victims. The full-purchase option
may achieve deterrence, but not compensation. 158
Defendants will indeed be perfectly deterred, as they will ultimately be
held accountable for the full sum they should be held accountable for. If
original class counsel settles for too little, a purchaser will buy the case
and pursue it. The defendant will ultimately pay the full amount of the
claim if the case is adjudicated or purchase a release for its true value,
given the risks and costs associated with the lawsuit, if a second
settlement is reached.
But this will not improve class members’ situation in any way. Class
members will still only be paid the original-settlement amount. In the
scenario described here, this amount is under-compensatory by
definition.159 The purchaser will pocket the full difference between the
157. A similar idea has been suggested to combat closely related (although not identical) concerns
in Parens Patria settlements. Briefly, these are cases in which State Attorneys General hire private
attorneys to pursue actions on their behalf. Although the problems in both settings are not identical, they
are closely related. Beach has suggested a post-settlement auction of the full settlement amount in these
cases. See Beach, supra note 5, at 492 – 505.
158. The full-purchase option functions as a Pigouvian tax. It may achieve optimal deterrence (or
optimal output levels in tax-law jargon). But absent a distributive method allocating the tax collected (or
the payment made by the defendant) to those harmed by the externality, it will not compensate the direct
victims harmed by the externality. See William J. Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities,
62 AM. ECON. REV. 307 (1972).
159. Another closely related problem is class members’ cooperation. Because class members have
nothing to gain once the lawsuit has been purchased, they will likely be less willing to cooperate with the
new purchaser. Rather than willingly appearing, witnesses may need to be subpoenaed; documents and
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value of the first settlement and the value of the second settlement or final
ruling.
By contrast, the auction of the right to act as counsel for the class
achieves both goals. Class members also share in the final outcome of the
case. In fact, the lion’s share of the additional amount ultimately paid will
accrue to class members because class counsel’s fees are only a fraction
of the total value of the settlement.160
A second problem with the purchase of the class’s cause of action is
that it requires paying an amount much greater than the amount required
when auctioning the right to act as class counsel. The full amount of a
settlement is, naturally, larger than class counsel’s fees by orders of
magnitude.161 Economic agents capable of providing such funds are
scarce. When settlement amounts are large, as they often are, only a
handful of agents are likely to be able to purchase the whole class’s right
of action. This makes this solution less practical. Moreover, as potential
funders of such purchases are rare, they will naturally possess market
power, which will in turn lead them to require a supra-competitive return
on their investment. Inadequacies that are not extreme do not provide such
a potential return and will not be worth the investment for funders that
possess market power.
By contrast, this Article’s proposed method allows the purchasing
entity to pay a fraction of the total value of the settlement. Any law firm
capable of handling the case on behalf of the class can participate in the

other pieces of evidence that are accessible to class members may not be provided to the new purchaser;
and so on. This shortcoming of the full-purchase option is probably not an extremely important one in all
class actions, because class members’ incentive to cooperate with the lawsuit is practically non-existent
in most cases anyway. Individual class members regularly stand to gain very little from the lawsuit, and
the cost of cooperation normally far exceeds any potential (private) advantage of such cooperation.
Nonetheless, at times individual class members who stand to receive more from the class action (for
example, because they are larger purchasers who have purchased a large number of units from the
defendant) may be more willing to cooperate when they stand to increase their individual compensation.
These larger class members will regularly have more helpful evidence to provide than other class
members, and so on. This willingness is lost under the full-purchase option. See also supra notes 22, 47
& 132.
160. Eisenberg et al., supra note 11, find that attorney’s fees are approximately 25% of the class’s
recovery (at 947 – 948). Class members will thus normally receive 75% of the additional payment. It is
unclear whether Eisenberg et al. measure the ratio between class counsel’s fees and the class’s recovery
or class counsel’s fees and the total payment (in cases in which class counsel’s fees are not paid directly
out of the class’s recovery). If the latter is the case, class members will accrue 80% of the total payment.
161. As a general rule of thumb, bidders will only have to pay a quarter of the total value of the
settlement (or a fifth, see id.). But even this might be an exaggeration. First, as explained, at present there
is reason to believe that attorney’s fees are excessive. Once a mechanism is put in place disincentivizing
the payment of excessive fees, the ratio of attorney’s fees to class recovery can be expected to decrease.
Additionally, it should be noted that Eisenberg et al. find a scaling effect, whereby the larger the class’s
recovery, the smaller the percentage of attorney’s fees (Figure 5). The larger the case, the smaller the
percentage of attorney’s fees. Where funding of the settlement is most costly, the payment required under
the method suggested in this Article will comprise an even smaller fraction of the settlement amount.
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auction. This, in turn, guarantees that terms of class settlements will be
closely monitored by a large number of law firms competing amongst
themselves to identify inadequate class settlements. In a recent survey of
class actions between 2009 and 2013, Eisenberg et al. found that for
ninety-two percent of class actions (those in which total recovery was
$100 million or less), the mean fee was approximately $2.5 million,
whereas the mean recovery was slightly greater than $10 million. 162 In all
of these cases, a single law firm (or a very small number of law firms
joining forces) should be able to participate in the auction. The outliers
were very large cases in which the award was $100 million or more. In
such cases, certainly in the few in which total class recovery exceeded
$500 million (1.5% of the cases),163 even the cost of class counsel’s fees
may have been too costly for any single firm, or even for a small number
of firms.
In such cases, a larger number of law firms can form an ad hoc
consortium. Several consortia of law firms of the plaintiffs’ bar may be
formed to compete amongst themselves to purchase the right to act as
class counsel. There would still be a very large number of such consortia
that would compete to purchase the appointment. The number of
economic agents reviewing the adequacy of settlements is thus multiplied
by thousands, if not more. Numerous law firms of the plaintiffs’ bar can
be expected to closely follow the terms of class settlements. And given
competition between them, they would also be willing to invest even for
a smaller rate of return, implying that even relatively minor inadequacies
will be rectified. The tolerable-inadequacy range will be much smaller
under the method proposed in this Article.
IV. CONCLUSION
One of the most perplexing issues of mass litigation is the inadequacy
of class settlements. Class settlements are a unique setting, in which class
counsel’s interests are aligned with the defendant’s interests, and in direct
opposition to class members’ interests. Class counsel and the defendant
both have an interest in increasing class counsel’s fees in return for a
reduction in the amount payable to class members. Due to class members’
rational apathy, class settlements also provide an opportunity for class
counsel and the defendant to further this joint interest. Similarly, class
counsel may mistakenly settle for a suboptimal amount.
Neither intentional sellouts nor genuine mistakes are properly
addressed by the current supervision mechanisms. Mechanisms that rely

162. Eisenberg et al., supra note 11, at 943.
163. Id. at 944.
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on court supervision are ineffective due to the court’s institutional
incompetence and lack of incentive to act as an adversary to the parties
before it and strike down settlements. Mechanisms that rely on class
members’ participation fail because class members are, generally,
rationally apathetic to the whole process. An abundance of research and
caselaw suggests that class settlements enrich class attorneys but offer
very little benefits to class members. There are many striking examples
of extreme cases in which attorneys walked away with hefty fees and class
members received illusory benefits. Class actions end up harming the very
individuals they were set up to benefit. Individual class members find
themselves bound by inappropriate settlements to the benefit of class
counsel and defendants.
The method proposed in this Article results in spontaneous correction
of class-settlement inadequacies. The proposed method would allow any
attorney or law firm to bid for the right to act as class counsel once a
settlement has been reached, while fixing the ratio of class counsel’s fees
to class recovery. The method aligns the various parties’ incentives in a
socially optimal manner both before and after a settlement is reached.
Instead of the court, an incompetent and ill-incentivized agent, a
practically infinite number of attorneys of the plaintiffs’ bar will function
as supervisors of class settlements. This method also relieves the court of
the time-consuming and ineffective task of reviewing the adequacy of
class settlements. No such review is ever necessary. The court may simply
sanction the last settlement without ever reviewing its terms. Public
expenditure is curbed and the socially optimal outcome is achieved.
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